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AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
CONTRACTING AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT DURING THE FIRST 
100 HOURS OF THE 2010 HAITIAN DISASTER RESPONSE 
OPERATION 
ABSTRACT 
The devastation caused by the recent earthquake in Haiti dramatically impaired the 
capabilities of all rapid response efforts.  The resulting extreme conditions made it 
difficult to transport and deliver equipment, materials, supplies, and services to the 
earthquake victims and the first responders.  The objective of this research is to analyze 
the effectiveness of the contracting and logistics support provided by the Department of 
Defense (DoD) through its collaborative disaster response effort—Operation Unified 
Response (OUR).  This analysis reviews the initial response time, coordination of efforts, 
adequacy of support, contract administration and oversight processes, and logistics 
management of OUR within the first 100 hours of the disaster.  Further, this analysis 
examines how the planners and coordinators of OUR used contracting and logistics to 
overcome the devastation that challenged their abilities to provide prompt relief to those 
in Haiti.  The research team studied recent DoD disaster response operations to help 
determine the how effective were DoD’s actions in the first 100 hours of the Haitian 
relief effort.  The researchers recommend further research to analyze the cost savings 
associated with early integration of Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) and 
Disaster Response Logisticians into the planning phases and life cycle of contingency 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The destruction caused by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti dramatically impaired the 
capability of all rapid response efforts.  The extreme conditions made it difficult to 
transport and deliver needed equipment, supplies, and services to the people of Haiti and 
first responders on the scene.  The role of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) during 
contingency operations is not to provide direct contracting and logistic support to disaster 
victims per-se, but rather to ensure that the warfighters and other DoD personnel receive 
timely and efficient supplies and services while supporting disaster operations (Clifton, 
2010).  This research team examined the effectiveness of the initial response time, 
planning and coordination, contract award administration and oversight, and other 
contracting and logistics support within the first 100 hours of the DoD disaster response 
effort.  The DoD commenced Operation Unified Response (OUR), headed by U.S. 
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), to coordinate the DoD’s response effort in support 
of Haiti.  This was commensurate to the establishment of agencies such as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID), which manages the coordination of all U.S. disaster response 
efforts domestic and abroad, respectively.  
When disaster strikes abroad, the U.S. Department of State (DOS) serves as the 
Lead Federal Agency (LFA) and relies on its regional bureau and USAID to coordinate 
the overall response (Travayiakis, 2008).  Therefore, all U.S. government organizations 
and agencies must coordinate their efforts with USAID, establish interagency alliances, 
and form alliances with non-government organizations (NGO) as well as other nations in 
order to formulate the right mix of contracting and logistics support needed during 
contingency operations.   
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In responding to the 7.0-magnitude earthquake that devastated Haiti on Tuesday, 
January 12, 2010, OUR first responders arrived in Haiti within 48 hours to provide 
support and services to DoD personnel involved in the disaster relief effort; however, 
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requirements and personnel responsibilities were initially unclear, making the first 100 
hours of the response effort uncoordinated and chaotic (Clifton, 2010).  The time it took 
for DoD to respond was still less than the length of time that human beings could survive 
without food or water (Modric, 2009).  According to Modric, doctors cite the timeframe 
for human survivability without food as three to four weeks and survivability without 
water as two to ten days depending on the person’s initial health, metabolism, state of 
mind, environment, etc.  In Haiti, the harsh environment and critical medical conditions/ 
health issues caused by the earthquake coupled with the resulting deficiencies in 
sanitation and nutrition severely diminished the survivability rate of the victims—except 
timely relief was provided.  Although OUR personnel were on ground within 48 hours of 
the Haitian disaster, they could not provide contracting and logistics aid fast enough.   
The devastation and extreme conditions in Haiti made delivery and transportation 
of fuel, equipment, supplies, and services extremely difficult.  Response efforts were 
further thwarted by hasty planning and forecasting, misaligned contracting and logistics 
capacities, and vague requirements and responsibilities (Clifton, 2010).  During disasters, 
when starvation and health issues like lethargy, physical weakness, weakened immune 
system, and inadequate body-temperature control can adversely affect victims, on-time 
relief is crucial to their survival.  Therefore, it is imperative that relief is available to 
victims immediately after disasters.   Researching the challenges that OUR team faced 
during the Haiti disaster response will enable planners and coordinators to identify best 
practices.  By incorporating data from lessons learned in Haiti response operation, DoD 
will develop ways to overcome these challenges to be better prepared for future crisis. 
B RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
The primary objective of this research is to determine DoD’s effectiveness of the 
DoD contracting and logistics support in Haiti during the initial response phase of the 
disaster.  To achieve these objectives, the researchers examined the immediate basic and 
logistics requirements of the victims and responders, how those requirements were 
determined and if the requirements were met during the first 100 hours of OUR.   The 
researchers considered the different response locations available to DoD in determining 
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whether or not the locations proximities to Haiti helped or hindered the efficiency in 
meeting the requirements.  This analysis used the Phase Zero concepts as a framework 
for exploring DoD’s preplanning effort and incorporation of contingency contracting 
officers into the planning phases of DoD operation.   
The secondary objective of this research is to analyze how planners and 
coordinators of OUR used contracting and logistics to overcome the devastation that 
challenged their ability to provide prompt relief to those in Haiti.  The researchers 
examined the DoD components that were involved in the response operation and to 
establish how and when tasks and responsibilities were assigned.  Early planning, training 
and appropriate level of logistics and contracting personnel involvement in Operational 
Planning (OPLAN) are instrumental to coordination and timely deployments of DoD 
assets during disasters.   In addressing the coordination among the key players, the 
researchers identified situational awareness command and control, communications as 
key factors for effective response operations; these were specifically addressed in 
Chapter IV as part of the team’s determination from findings.   
A tertiary research objective is to review the contracting support and processes 
and that were utilized in OUR and whether there was sufficient contracts oversight and 
administration during OUR given the extreme circumstances in Haiti.  From information 
provided by participants, DoD utilized Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational 
Tracking (SPOT) as a means of tracking its contractors.  The researchers examined the 
application of SPOT in Haiti to determine its effectiveness in meeting contracts oversight 
requirements.    
Although the main objective of this research was not to examine the challenges 
encountered by the DoD response team during OUR, the researchers deemed that 
addressing these challenges will shed more light into why DoD was or was not effective 
during the first 100 hours of its response to the Haiti disaster response.  Additionally, the 
researchers, analyzed how performance and throughput were measured since the 
effectiveness of an operation can be further analyzed based on the standard of 
performance measurement.  
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To determine DoD’s response effectiveness during the first 100 hours of OUR it 
was critical for the researchers to develop research questions that would address the 
research objectives.  The researchers noticed that when left unguided, interviewees at 
times felt at liberty to provide superfluous information, which often resulted in 
conceptual dichotomy.  To preclude these situations and to keep interviewees focused on 
providing only relevant information for this analysis, the researchers developed the 
interview questions below to specifically address the research objectives.   
The first two groups of interview questions addressed the primary research 
objective while the third set of interview questions addressed the secondary research 
objective, and the fourth and fifth sets of interview questions addressed the third research 
objective.  Additionally, the sixth and seventh sets of questions addressed the challenges 
DoD encountered during OUR and how it measured performance and throughput.  The 
interview questions will be denoted by the letters IQ, while the primary, secondary and 
tertiary questions will be denoted by numbers 1 through 3. 
The primary research question is as follows: 
1. How effective was DoD’s contracting and logistics support to Haiti within 
the first 100 hours of the disaster? 
The primary research question was tailored to address the primary research 
objective; however, the following supplementary questions were required to successfully 
answer the research question.    
IQ-1:  What were the immediate basic and logistics requirements? 
IQ-1a:  How were requirements determined? 
IQ-1b:  Where these requirements met in a timely manner? 
IQ-2  What were relief locations available to DoD during OUR?  
IQ-2a: Were there alternate supply sources where components closest to 
contingency locations (domestic/international) would respond quickly? 
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The secondary research objective was addressed by the second research question 
and its supplementary questions as follow: 
2. How did planners and coordinators of OUR use contracting and logistics 
to overcome the devastation that challenged their ability to provide prompt 
relief to those in Haiti? 
 
IQ- 3: How were contracting and logistics efforts coordinated?  
IQ- 3a: Was there effective command and control?     
 
IQ- 3b: At what point were tasks and responsibilities assigned? 
 
IQ- 3c: Was prior training conducted to prepare first responder for their    
assigned responsibilities?  
 
IQ- 3d: Were contracting and logistics personnel integrated into the 
operational planning phase (OPLAN)? 
The third research question and the supplementary questions are as follows: 
3. What contracting support and processes were utilized during OUR and 
was there sufficient contracts oversight and administration given the 
extreme circumstances in Haiti? 
IQ-4:  What were the contracting support requirements?  
IQ-4a:  How were these requirements determined?  
IQ-4b: Were there pre-awarded contracts in place prior to the disaster?  
IQ-4c: What were the contract types? 
IQ-4d: Was there adequate competition in awarding the contracts? 
 
IQ-4e: hat contracting methods and procedures were utilized? 
 
IQ-4f: How were contracts negotiated and awarded? 
IQ-5: Was there adequate contract administration and contracts  
oversight? 
Finally, we addressed the following Additional Interview Questions based on 
their significance in DoD’s effectiveness during OUR.  Each of these additional questions 
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has 11 and 5 sub-questions. For the ease of compilation, only the additional research 
questions are listed but the sub-questions will be listed and analyzed in Chapter III. 
4. What were the contracting and logistics challenges?  
5. Performance Measurement and throughput:  
Responses to the above seven interview questions helped the researchers build an 
objective research analysis that was vetted through a panel of experienced subject matter 
experts in the fields of contracting and disaster response logistics.  The analysis 
highlights the effectiveness of DoD contracting and logistics planning and coordination 
during the first 100 hours of OUR.  
D. SCOPE AND DELIVERABLES  
The scope of this research include information gathered from participants 
interviewed by the researchers, information gathered from past and present reports on 
disasters, disaster relief operations, and DoD involvement in the business of disaster 
response and contributions from subject matter experts who were involved in OUR.  The 
deliverables were designed specifically for the purpose of this research and to answer the 
research questions previously identified.  This research achieved the following 
objectives:  
a. Collected and examined information on OUR from several sources, 
including subject matter experts and reviewed studies on contingency 
contracting and disaster response logistics; 
b. Utilized the information collected to analyze the DoD’s effectiveness 
during OUR.  Additionally, it addressed the coordination of logistics and 
contracting capabilities required to meet DoD response objectives and the 
challenges encountered by the response personnel; 
c. Determined DoD’s response effectiveness from the analysis performed 
and the researchers impression from the interviews conducted and 
information reviewed;  
d. Developed a model, the Stella’s Future Contracts and Logistics Model 
(SFCLM), which offers the logistics parallel to the Yoder Three-Tier 
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Model (YTTM) hierarchy for credentialing contingency contracting 
officers (Yoder, 2004).  This model promotes early identification and 
training of disaster relief logisticians and contracting specialist to 
maximize DoD’s disaster response effectiveness;  
e. Answered the research questions, proposed relevant recommendations, 
and suggested areas for further research. 
SOUTHCOM already has a disaster response process in place for OUR’s disaster 
response operations.  Therefore, the alternative approach is developed to streamline and 
improve that process by defining possible logistics requirements, mapping out possible 
response centers through regional segmentation, and creating a model to facilitate pre-
awarded contracts such as: Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts and 
Multiple Awards Contracts (MAC) prior to disasters (Yoder, 2010), this preplanning 
initiative will enable the delivery of rapid logistics support to disaster victims. 
E. LIMITATIONS 
The most limiting factor of this research was this team’s ability to gather accurate 
accounts of the actions taken from the time OUR was initiated to the 100th hour of the 
operation.  There was also minimal documented data (statistical and non-statistical) 
available to this team that focused on OUR’s contracting and logistics effort during the 
first 100 hours of the operation.  Therefore, much of the information pertaining to the 
actual events of the first 100 hours came from interviews and internet resources.  
Additionally, establishing the exact hour that operations began limited the team’s ability 
to properly frame the accounts to be examined and/or provide a timeline of the events.  
Such data is stated in an operation order, which is classified information.  This study 
reveals only unclassified research.   
F. METHODOLOGY  
The researchers are a team of two Navy Lieutenant Commanders who are students 
in the fields of Contracting and Logistics at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California.  The team members have over thirty years of combined military service, 
twenty years of combined logistics and supply chain management experience, and three 
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years of contracting.  Additionally, a Senior Lecturer of Contingency Contracting and 
Professor of Logistic Operations with over fifty years of combined experience provided 
the researchers with valuable academic materials and professional guidance throughout 
the conduct of this analysis.  This team chose the Haiti disaster response operation for 
research due to their common interests in improving DoD’s logistics and contracting 
processes to facilitate effective disaster response efforts. 
The team began this analysis by reviewing a variety of works pertaining to the 
2010 Haiti disaster, as well as other disaster response logistics and contracting academic 
literature.  The team focused its effort on gathering and consolidating literature from 
sources like the Government Accounting Office (GAO), Congress, Combatant 
Commanders (COCOM), and government agencies.  These readings covered past and 
present disaster response efforts involving DoD in order to help formulate an informed 
opinion of DoD disaster response operations.  By reviewing this literature, the researchers 
uncovered historical data on some past natural and man-made disasters and data on how 
the U.S., and DoD in particular, responded to them.   
The researchers also interviewed and collected data from personnel who were on 
ground immediately following the earthquake, those who were involved in the planning 
and coordination of OUR and other subjects matter experts assigned to the following 
DoD commands: 
1. U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Miami, FL – served as the lead 
command in the JTF Operation Unified Response; 
2. Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Jacksonville, FL – provided 
contracting and logistics capabilities in addition to delegating contracting 
and logistics personnel to support OUR; 
3. Naval Operational Logistics Support Center (NOLSC), Norfolk, VA – 
coordinates logistics of naval vessels and naval support personnel 
involved in OUR. 
With the data collected, the research team reviewed studies on contingency 
contracting and disaster response logistics, analyzed recent humanitarian operations 
involving DoD and the recommendations from studies conducted by experts, such as the 
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disaster/humanitarian professionals of the Fritz Institute1.  The researchers were able to 
identify some developments in the way DoD responds to disasters, but they also found 
some shortcomings the response process, such as improper precontingency (Phase Zero) 
planning, Command, Control, and Communications, and uncoordinated response among 
the various agencies, which adversely impacted the delivery lead times and effectiveness 
of the operations.  Armed with the research data and the JEBC, YTTM, and Phase-Zero 
concepts, the researchers proposed the SFCLM Model to further streamline and improve 
DoD’s disaster relief effort (Yoder, 2010).    
G. POTENTIAL BENEFITS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS  
The researchers believe that this research will broaden understanding of the 
intricate details of disaster response and pinpoint some of the reasons why DoD’s first 
responders could not provide effective response to the disaster victims upon their arrival 
in Haiti.  The result of this study will be pertinent to planning for future disasters and 
disaster response operations with improved methodology, modeling, and strategy 
implementation.  Coupled with advanced training, the result of this research may allow 
DoD to improve its response time and the quality of support it provides, while reducing 
the cost of providing “knee-jerk” logistics supports and contract awards, and the potential 
issues and conflicts that can result if important contracting guidelines are neglected in 
accommodating the compelling needs of disaster response and in providing urgent 
response to disaster victims. 
H. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT   
This research is organized as follows: Chapter I, Introduction, introduces the case 
study and provides information on the background, the objectives of the research, the 
problem statement, identifies the scope and deliverables, lists the potential benefits and 
limitations of the study, illustrates the method used in conducting the study, and outlines 
how the research is organized.  Chapter II, Literature Review, examines pertinent data, 
                                                 
1 “The Fritz Institute is a nonprofit organization that works in partnership with governments, nonprofit 
organizations and corporations around the world to innovate solutions and facilitate the adoption of best 
practices for rapid and effective disaster response and recovery.” (Fritz Institute, 2010). 
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articles, reports, publication, and scholarly work on disasters, disaster relief efforts, 
contingency contracting, disaster response/humanitarian logistics, and other topics on 
disaster and disaster response operations relevant to this research. Chapter III, Research 
Questions Analysis, the researchers analyzed the data collected from interviewees, data 
collected from online sources, as well as other sources such as academic work on disaster 
responses and reports written by subject matter experts in the field of logistical and/or 
contracting.  The analysis answers the interview questions developed by the researchers 
and sets the stage for determination of DoD’s effectiveness addressed in Chapter IV.  
Chapter IV, Determinations and Findings, utilized the answers and findings from the 
previous chapter to interpret the case study results by presenting a situational analysis and 
comparative analysis of DoD’s effectiveness in Haiti disaster relief and expanded on the 
JEBC, YTTM and Phase-Zero concepts to create an alternate model, the SFCLM, for 
disaster response (Yoder, 2010). Chapter V, Conclusion and Recommendations: 
summarizes the case study, outlines the implications for future disaster response 
operations, and provides recommendations for future research.  
I. SUMMARY  
Chapter I provided an introduction to DoD’s involvement in the disaster response 
effort to Haiti.  It informed the reader that the effectiveness of DoD’s logistics and 
contracting support within the first 100 hours of Operation Unified Response is the focus 
of this research, which then led into the purpose.  Furthermore, the evolution of DoD’s 
disaster response efforts was revealed in an in depth background of disasters in which the 
DoD was involved, as well as a brief history of Haitian disasters.  This chapter also 
presented the research objective and questions, some research limitations, the method in 
which the research was accomplished, and potential benefits. 
Chapter II details the literature used as the basis of this research.  Additionally, it 
describes disaster-response logistics, contingency contracting, and some challenges of 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines present and historical literature on domestic and 
international disasters, with emphasis on Haiti and U.S., to evaluate the effectiveness of 
DoD disaster responses, in terms of providing expedited supplies and services to disaster 
victims and those responding to the disaster.   
A comprehensive review of related literature showed that initial response, or 
assessment period, tends to be chaotic and reactive in nature due to unclear requirements 
and rapid response times, as opposed to the detailed and structured planning associated 
with a long-term, sustained relief operation (Apte, 2009).  Although, DoD’s response to 
Haiti evolved into a sustained relief operation, this study concentrates on DoD’s effort in 
the planning and preparation phase of the disaster response life cycle, termed Phase Zero, 
into the start of deployment Phase I, including the first 100 hours of the Haiti disaster 
response. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The rumble and mayhem from the 2010 Haiti earthquake made DoD’s response to 
the disaster and the ensuing recovery efforts excruciating at best.  Housing, hospitals, 
schools, and many government buildings were destroyed. Vital utilities like water and 
electricity were completely disrupted, and major transportation routes were damaged 
and/or blocked, including the nation’s primary seaport.  Search and rescue was one of the 
initial primary missions. The lack of usable transportation routes, communication 
networks, infrastructure, electricity, and clean water severely hindered all efforts to 
deliver assistance to the disaster stricken nation of Haiti (Taft-Morales & Margesson, 
2010).   
To fully understand the involvement of DoD in the business of disaster response, 
an overview of some past and present disasters that struck Haiti and the U.S. is necessary.  
This background gives the history of Haiti and U.S. disasters over several centuries, and 
how the U.S. responded to those disasters.  It also reveals the organizations, agencies and 
infrastructure U.S. and DoD established to coordinate their disaster response efforts and 
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as a part of the U.S. National Security Strategic direction to broaden DoD’s involvement 
in humanitarian assistance and disaster response, relief, and recovery operations.   
1. History of Haiti’s Natural Disasters 
Located at latitude 19º 00' north of the equator and longitude 72º 25' west of the 
Greenwich, Haiti occupies 27,560 sq km of land and 190 sq km of water and covers two 
thirds of the island of Hispaniola—the Dominican Republic occupies the remaining one 
third.  Other neighboring islands include Jamaica, Cuba, Bahamas and Puerto Rico.  
Haiti’s terrain is rough mountainous and sits in the middle of the hurricane belt subject to 
severe storms during the periods between June and October each year, with occasional 
flooding, earthquakes, and periodic droughts.  This makes Haiti one of the most 
seismically active islands in South America (CIA, 2010).   Its long history of deadly 
earthquakes dates back to the 1700s.  According to the French historian, Moreau de 
Saint-Méry (1750–1819), the earthquake that struck Haiti in October 1751 destroyed all 
but one masonry building in the country’s capital of Port-Au-Prince, leaving behind a 
devastation that would take several years to rebuild.  Another destructive earthquake 
occurred in June 1770 and destroyed the whole city; in May 1842, an earthquake 
destroyed Cap-Haitian and Sans-Souci Palace; in 1946, a magnitude 8.0 earthquake 
struck Dominican Republic and shook Haiti, producing a Tsunami, which killed 1,790 
people (Soeze, 2010).   
Overall, Haiti catastrophes range from man-made disasters to acts of God.  For 
instance, Hurricane Gordon (1994), Hurricane George (1998), and Hurricane Jeanne 
(2004) claimed 1,000, 400, and 3,000 lives respectively.  In 2008, four tropical systems 
hit the city of Gonaives and in 2008, 90 people died and 150 injured when a local school 
building collapsed due to poor construction (Mattingly, 2008).   Whereas the deadliest 
recorded earthquake in history occurred on January 23, 1556, in Shaanxi, China killing 





300,000 people injured, 1 million homeless, 250,000 residential plus 30,000 commercial 
buildings destroyed, is the fifth recorded deadliest earthquake and Haiti’s most 
catastrophic disaster (USCG, 2010).  
Earthquakes are not restricted to foreign countries.  Several earthquakes have 
struck the U.S. over the past two hundred years.  In April 1906, San Francisco, California 
earthquake and fire claimed 3,000 American lives.  In 2003, earthquake claimed two lives 
in central California.  Earthquakes and other disasters such as tsunamis and landslides are 
recoded across the western states of America including Missouri, Alaska, Hawaii, 
Montana, Arkansas, Oregon, and Washington State (Epic Disasters, 2009). These 
disasters may have claimed fewer lives than the 2010 Haiti earthquake, but a country like 
the U.S., which is also seismically active, can face disasters of significant magnitude at 
anytime.  Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the U.S. not only supports other 
disaster stricken countries, but it must learn to respond expeditiously to such crisis 
whether foreign or domestic.  Accordingly, in the wake of the 7.0 magnitude earthquake 
that struck Haiti in January 2010, many nations including the United States rallied 
together and provided support to the earthquake-devastated nation.  
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Figure 1.   Haiti Earthquake Intensity Map (SOUTHCOM, 2010) 
2. Partial Overview of Disasters and Disaster Response Operations in 
the United States Since the Twentieth Century 
In the 1900s, several U.S. territories experienced multiple disasters such as the 
Galveston Hurricane and Storm Surge in 1900, San Francisco Earthquake in 1906, the 
Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, droughts of 1930–1931, and the Texas City Disaster in 
1947.  In all of these disasters, Non Government Organizations (NGO) and the U.S. 
Military provided the first, and oftentimes the only responses to assist the disaster 
victims.  In 1889, the American Red Cross (ARC) set up one of the first national disaster 
response centers to provide food, water stations, shelters, and medical care to the disaster 
victims of the Johnstown Flood (Texas Impact.org 2006).   
Prior to 1950, the United States Congress would only fund disaster relief efforts 
as disasters occurred because of its notion that disaster reliefs were best handled by 
 15
charitable organizations.  Thus, relief efforts in the United States weighed heavily on 
local, state, and NGO.  These piecemeal relief efforts though well intended, were 
ineffective and such response system continued until series of disasters in Texas, 
culminated by the Texas City Disaster, forced the state to reform its disaster response 
operations and enact legislations that created organizations to handle its disaster response 
efforts.  These organization offered support to local authorities and coordinated the 
efforts between federal government and those local authorities during disasters or crisis 
response (TexasImpact.org, 2006). 
In 1951, Texas Civil Protection Act, created by McGill, was passed to 
synchronize different state resources within a predetermined plan. It also formed the State 
Civil Defense and Disaster Relief Council, which comprised state department heads that 
were directly involved in disaster response operations.  This Act shed more light on the 
need for reforming U.S. fragmented disaster response operations not only in Texas, but 
within all applicable federal agencies. In 1950, the U.S. Congress enacted the Federal 
Disaster Relief Program, which transferred the power to declare federal disasters to the 
president.  However, the federal government role was initially limited to supplementing  
local and state disaster relief operations.  Government roles in disaster response, has since 
evolved to greater levels of involvements throughout the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries (Texas Impact.org 2006).   
In the 1960s, the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA), which was 
established within the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), provided 
response and recovery efforts in various parts of the country—from the 1964 Earthquake 
in Anchorage Alaska to the 1969 Hurricane Camille.  These responses were still 
fragmented and uncoordinated among the different agencies, particularly, the response to 
hurricane Camille victims were unequally distributed and resulted in dissatisfaction and 
complaints from minorities victims and victims of lower socio-economic classes who 
were underprovided for during the relief effort.  These complaints eventually set the stage 
for the ARC to establish the first standardized guidelines for providing fair and equal 
assistance to all disaster victims (Texasimpact.org, 2006).      
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As a remedy to coordination issues, seven voluntary, non-government agencies 
joined forces in 1970 to form the National Voluntary Organizations Assisting Disaster 
(NVOAD), which provided a forum for disaster relief agencies to communicate and 
ensure that humanitarian assistances were not duplicated.  During this period, there were 
over 100 federal agencies established to provide disaster, hazards, and emergency 
services.  These government agencies were still uncoordinated especially at the local and 
state levels.  Agencies that provided similar services worked in isolation, such that their 
efforts were often duplicated (Texasimpact.org, 2006).  
3. Creation of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
To resolve issues of failed, inadequate, and ineffective responses to natural 
disasters, President Jimmy Carter in 1979 created the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), by merging different disaster-related agencies, to handle the emergency 
aspect of civil defense and to integrate disaster response and relief responsibilities within 
the different federal agencies involved.  FEMA became a very important organization to 
the point where President Clinton raised it to cabinet level and appointed James Lee Witt 
its director in 2003 (Pbs.org, 2005). FEMA’s main objective is to lead the nation in 
preparing, responding, and recovering from disasters—both natural and man-made.  
FEMA incorporates agencies like the National Flood Insurance Program, the National 
Fire Prevention and Control Administration, the Federal Disaster Assistance 
Administration, etc., and trains them in first response and emergency preparedness 
(Texas Impact.org, 2006).  FEMA was integrated into the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) in 2003 by President Bush following the September 11, 2001 (9–11) 
terrorists attack on the World Trade Center in New York City and the DHS made it a part 
of the National Response Plan in December 2004 (Pbs.org, 2005). 
4. Other Domestic Disasters  
Since its inception, FEMA faced several challenges and suffered harsh criticism 
especially during the Cuban refugee crisis, the Three Mile Island nuclear power accident, 
the 1989 Prieta Loma earthquake, the 1992 Hurricane Andrew, the 9–11 terrorists attack, 
and more recently the 2005 Hurricane Katrina in the U.S. gulf coasts (Pbs.org, 2005).   
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Katrina made its first major landfall in the Gulf Coast on August 29, 2005, and a 
few more landfalls within days of the first (NHC, 2005).  Katrina and Rita affected over 
90,000 square miles in the Gulf regions, roughly the size of Great Britain and spawned 
approximately 43 tornadoes across several states, leaving over 1,500,000 victims in their 
wakes.  About 1,833 of the victims lost their lives to Katrina and over 800,000 of those 
who survived were displaced.  Katrina is by far one of the most catastrophic hurricanes in 
the history of United States (DHS, 2005) rivaled in intensity by Hurricane Camille of 
1969, which though more severe than Katrina at landfall and followed similar track, was 
not as extensive as Katrina in terms of areas affected (NHC, 2006).   Other hurricanes in 
U.S. history, which surpassed Katrina and places it in third position among the U.S. 
deadliest hurricanes are the hurricane that hit Galveston, Texas, in 1900, claiming over 
8,000 lives, and the Lake Okeechobee, Florida, hurricane that claimed over 2,500 lives in 
1928.  
Together with Katrina, Hurricane Rita—which hit the gulf coast in late September 
2005, one month after Katrina’s landfall—revealed several shortcomings in U.S. disaster 
response operation and preparedness.  U.S. agencies responses to Katrina were late, 
uncoordinated, inadequate, and presented series of significant breakdowns and lack of 
leadership from federal government agencies, particularly FEMA.   As a result of the 
poorly coordinated initial response to Katrina, which President George W. Bush termed 
“not acceptable” (Pbs.org, 2005), many reforms were implemented including the Post-
Katrina Emergency Reform Act, which extensively restructured FEMA and afforded it a 
considerable authority to bridge several gaps that were revealed during the response to 
Hurricane Katrina. The U.S. must continue to improve its disaster response lead times 
and recovery processes through effective control, communication and coordination of 
efforts within government and non-government agencies.    
B. DISASTER RESPONSE LOGISTICS  
The latest monograph by Dr. Aruna Apte, titled Humanitarian Logistics: A New 
Field of Research and Action, addressed the issues and necessary actions to execute 
effective humanitarian logistics when disasters strike.  In it she defines humanitarian 
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logistics as a specialized field of study critical to the overall readiness of response/relief 
efforts.  Additionally, she discussed the management of response supply chains, 
addressing challenges such as demand surges, uncertainty of supply, and time-critical 
time windows (Apte, 2009).  Much of the works cited in this study are attributed to the 
reference from Apte (2009) the areas of humanitarian and disaster-response logistics, as 
represented in the following paragraphs. 
Having knowledge of disaster-response logistics is critical to developing an 
understanding of its performance measures and the challenges that confront it.  Therefore, 
Disaster-response logistics is defined as the process of planning, implementing and 
controlling the efficient, cost-effective flow and storage of goods and materials, as well 
as related information, from the point of origin to the point of consumption, for the 
purpose of alleviating the suffering of vulnerable people (Thomas, 2003).   
Disaster-response logistics covers a range of activities to include procurement, 
transportation, material tracking, customs relations, warehousing, and last-mile delivery 
(Thomas, 2003, p. 15).  The researchers wanted to develop a firm understanding of the 
issues surrounding disaster response logistics in order to better assess the effectiveness of 
the DoD’s response to Haiti.  The scale of the network it takes to mobilize resources and 
personnel possessing the requisite knowledge and experience to assist distressed people 
affected by natural disasters and complex emergency situations is enormous.  To 
accomplish such an objective is remarkable, given the exceptionality of the resource and 
logistics requirements, the austerity of the disaster locations, and the chaotic 
circumstances surrounding the situation.  
Infrastructure such as bridges, roads, and airports is often destroyed, severely 
limiting or disabling transport.  Local and national governments, through which 
humanitarian organizations must often coordinate their activities, may be severely 
impacted, or even defunct in the case of a conflict situation (Thomas & Kopczak, 2005).  
Logistics is vital to all disaster relief operations.  It is what links preparedness and 
response, procurement and distribution, and headquarters and the field.  It drives 
operational effectiveness and response and is the most fiscally strained component of a 
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relief effort.  Logistics provides valuable data (e.g., cost, quantity, timelines, etc.) for 
both present and potential disaster-response operations and programs (Thomas, 2003).   
Logistic challenges are anticipated in most disaster situations; however, there are 
self-inflicted challenges inherent to a disaster response and in this analysis, this team 
reveals those adversities and their relevance to the DoD’s response to Haiti.  
Preparedness is a huge challenge for disaster-response organizations.  A system designed 
to minimize risk and vulnerability enhances preparedness and perpetuates responsiveness.  
However, when disaster strikes, these organizations often spend much of their time 
putting out fires (i.e. resolving minor issues), which can lead to delays in the response 
effort (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009).  
The Fritz Institute, the non-profit disaster relief organization introduced in 
Chapter I, conducted a four-year study that uncovers the most common challenges 
disaster-response organizations are faced with and found that disaster preparedness was 
severely hindered by funding shortages.  It is difficult to subsidize preparedness when 
most disaster funding is earmarked for relief.  A former head of logistics at the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Crescent Societies (IFRC) once stated, “It is 
easy to find resources to respond, it is hard to find resources to be more ready to respond” 
(Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009).  The study also determined that logisticians were 
largely not involved in the assessment phase of relief efforts and that critical logistic 
decisions were dictated by program staff, vice experienced field logisticians.  For 
instance, a survey of the largest agencies involved in the Indonesian tsunami relief 
operation revealed that 42% of the assessment teams deployed did not have a logistician 
assigned (Thomas & Kopczak, 2005). 
Furthermore, a deficient number of trained and experienced professional 
logisticians were found to be a common trend amongst humanitarian organizations, due 
to a lack of formalized training, highly tacit field knowledge, intense operational tempo, 
and soaring turnover rates of up to 80% annually.  Of those involved in the tsunami relief, 
74% of the logisticians surveyed did not have access to advanced tracking technology 
(Thomas & Kopczak, 2005).  Such technology has revolutionized commercial and  
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military supply chains, while investments in such information systems are discouraged in 
humanitarian organizations.  Also, fiscal competition has deterred the potential for 
partnerships and increased information sharing.     
C. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING  
Planners of disaster response logistics must be conversant with a very vital aspect 
of disaster relief operations and perhaps one of the most important factors in addressing 
the challenges of disaster response logistics, that aspect is contingency contracting.  
Contingency contracting is a functional component within the greater scope of defense 
contracting (Arzu et al., 2010).  A contract is a mutually binding legal relationship 
(Yoder, 2004) that requires the adherence to statutory lays, guidance and Federal 
Acquisition Requirements policies and procedures.  Contracting for disaster response 
requirements and logistics can be very challenging and time consuming except adequate 
planning and preparations are made prior to contingencies.  
Although, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) authorizes contracting 
officers to streamline contracting efforts and sometimes waive the Competition In 
Contracting Act (CICA), 10 U.S.C. 2304 and 41 U.S.C. 253, vaguely defined 
requirements and damages to infrastructures to support delivery of those requirements 
make expedited contracting and logistics support very difficult and oftentimes 
impossible, during the beginning phase of contingencies. CICA mandates contracting 
officers to pursue full and open competition (FAR 6.101) to the maximum extent 
practicable in soliciting offers and awarding government contracts.  Yoder (2010) 
recommends precontingency preparations during Phase Zero of the contingency planning 
life cycle.  Phase Zero in DoD contingency includes the events shaping, grooming and 
planning initiatives phase, prior to actual contingencies. There is usually no time 
limitation in Phase Zero, it merges into Phase One at the onset of contingencies.   
1. What Is a Contingency?  
“A contingency is an event that requires the deployment of military forces in 
response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and order, 
political instability, or other military operations” (Yoder, 2004). The Federal Acquisition 
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Regulations (FAR) defines contingency operation (10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13)) as a military 
operation that—  (1) Is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, 
or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; 
or (2) Results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the 
uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, or 12406 of 
10 U.S.C., Chapter 15 of 10 U.S.C., or any other provision of law during a war or during 
a contingency or national emergency declared by the President or Congress (FAR 2.101).  
Contingencies can be declared or undeclared.  A declared contingency is an operation 
designated by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) when members of the U.S. military 
under Title 10USC (a)(13) are expected to engage an enemy of the United States with 
military actions. A contingency operation may also be declared by the president or 
congress when members of the uniformed services are called to active services in 
accordance with Title 10 USC or any provision of law during a declared war or national 
emergencies (Yoder, 2004). 
Contingencies span a vast range of military operations (ROMO) such as: major 
theater wars, small scale contingencies, domestic and international disaster and/or 
emergency relief, peace keeping, nation building, stability operations, extraction and/or 
evacuation operations, and other humanitarian operations.  DoD planners must consider 
the type of contingency environment they are involved with in order to adequately meet 
the logistics requirements (Yoder, 2010).  In Haiti, the environment was immature since 
there was very little supporting infrastructure such as adequate financial systems for 
supporting complex transactions, pliable roads and good transportation network, and 
business capability. 
2. The Phases of Contingency Operation  
There are presently four phases of contingency planning and operations (Phases 
one through four).  However, contingency planning should not begin when there is an 
actual contingency or emergency situation.  Yoder recommends that the four phases of 
major operations adapted from the joint publication doctrine should be expanded to 
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include a Phase Zero as the planning phase for contingencies prior to the actual 
occurrences of disasters (Yoder, 2010). Since Phase Zero is has not been integrated into 
the contingency planning, it will be addressed (last) after the original four phases. 
i Phase One: Mobilization and initial deployment (first 30–45 days): Phase 
one is implemented when there is a warning order or when there is an 
actual contingency event. Once Phase One is deployed, the main focus 
becomes basic life support and security provisions above all else.  Food 
and water, utilities, transportation, fuel, sanitation, interpreters and guides 
are other major requirements during this phase. In Haiti, the requirements 
hierarchy was similar: Medical care, food and water, shelter, etc. 
 
ii Phase Two:  Build up (day 45 and thereafter): continued effort to 
prioritized basic life support and security provisions, construction and 
standing up infrastructures, habitability, quality of life, establishing solid 
and reliable vendor base, and ensuring contracting control and 
administration.  
 
iii Phase Three: Sustainment (past build-up until termination phase): basic 
life support and security remain top priorities, executing contracts like: 
Indefinite Delivery, Multiple Awards, and Blanket contracts.  These 
should be in place during Phase Zero. Hence, it is imperative that 
contracting personnel are incorporated into OPLANs, so that they can 
provide contracting capabilities to improve and refine internal controls, 
increase competition in vendor base, establish a “pull” contracting system 
for items not in theater, create dormant contracts for contingent and “extra 
ordinary” events, and plan for awarding contracts for the termination of 
operations at the end of the contingency. 
 
iv Phase Four: Termination and redeployment (may take a long time to 
achieve—sometimes longer than the operation itself).  Basic life support 
and security provisions remain as top priorities throughout the four phases, 
but during this phase, the main highlights shift to items like packing and 
freight services, transportation, contracts termination, contract closeouts, 
and securing audits and accountability prior to exit.  
 
v Phase Zero: This phase is addressed last because it is not currently part of 
the contingency lifecycle.  Nevertheless, this phase should be where DoD 
prepares and plans for its contingency operations—prior to Phase One.  
Phase Zero should facilitate DoD contingency events shaping, grooming 
and planning initiatives.  There is no time limitation in Phase Zero.  In his 
Phase-Zero Report Draft (Phase Zero), Yoder considers synchronization 
of personnel, platforms, and protocols for integrated planning and 
execution of contracting functions in OPLANs and OPORDs with the 
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Unified Combatant Commander’s intent and effect, essential to the 
effective implementation of Phase Zero concept (Yoder, 2010). 
The Phase Zero concept is not a completely new concept.  According to Poree, et 
al., the Commanding General of Joint Contracting Command (JCC) in Iraq/ Afghanistan 
(JCC-I/A) aligned tactical contracting efforts with strategic objectives of the Combatant 
Commander’s Campaign Plan (CCCP) through integration of Contingency Contracting 
Officers (CCO) into war fighters’ Operational Plan (OPLAN) (Poree et al, 2008).   The 
Yoder Phase Zero concepts utilize existing platforms and protocols the basis for the 
concept development. Yoder analyzed critical contracting capabilities that are lacking at 
the strategic level of planning; therefore, he identified/defined the caliber of personnel 
that should be integrated at the Phase Zero phase.  Selected personnel should be a well-
seasoned contracting officer with the right credentials, knowledge, experience, and 
education, for whom Yoder coined the term, Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE).  
According to Yoder, the IPE would become valuable in assigning specific tasks for 
planning development and establishing pre-awarded contracts in Phase Zero (Yoder, 
2010).   
According to Richard Goodale Junior’s article, Planning for War: A System, 
“planning must be visionary, quick, flexible, and adaptive” (1994). Military planners 
must be adaptive to the Phase Zero concept and understand the planning system designs 
in order to improve disaster response processes. The Joint Operation Planning and 
Execution System (JOPES) portrays peacetime as the best time for structuring and 
planning in addition to developing deliberate plan (before crisis) (Joint Publication 5.0), 
however, DoD is not fully integrating contracting and logistics experts at the Phase Zero 
level of planning.  The DoD Joint Publication (Joint Pub) 4–10 defines successful 
operational contract support as “the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision 
of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing that 
support.”  So far, provision for contracting support experts has yet to be integrated into 
the early planning phases of operations.  
Synchronizing contracted support requirements, contracting planning and the 
execution of operational contract support oversight are key functions of the supported  
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Unified Combatant Commander (CCDR) and the respective Joint Forces Commanders 
(JFC).  In Haiti, the JTF responsible was assigned to OUR under the CCDR, 
SOUTHCOM as reviewed below. 
D. OVERVIEW OF DOD SOUTHERN COMMAND (SOUTHCOM) 
As stated in Chapter I, SOUTHCOM was designated as the DoD combatant 
command tasked with the overall planning and coordination of Operation Unified 
Response (OUR).  Christened SOUTHCOM in 1963 by the Kennedy administration (to 
reflect its geographic interests), SOUTHCOM, is the direct descendant of the U.S. 
military units dispatched to Panama in the early 1920s.  It is also a World War II (WWII) 
prototype of unified military organization, U.S. Caribbean Defense Command, formed by 
the Roosevelt administration in the 1940’s.  During the last century, SOUTHCOM’s 
mission shifted from defending the Panama Canal and its surrounding area, contingency 
planning for the cold war activities and administration of foreign military assistance 
program in Central and South America to counter-drug operations and humanitarian 
missions.   In September 1997, SOUTHCOM relocated from Panama to Miami, Florida 
(Coleman, 2009), and once again its mission shifted to “providing contingency planning, 
operations, and security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean 
(except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions), Cuba; as well as for the force 
protection of U.S. military resources at these locations. SOUTHCOM is also tasked with 
ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal and canal area” (Coleman, 2009). 
1. Scope of Responsibilities 
The scope of  SOUTHCOM’s responsibilities today may seem broader than its 
twentieth-century mission; nevertheless, its current personnel strength of  about 1,200 
military and civilian employees, representing the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, 
Coast Guard, and several federal agencies (SOUTHCOM, 2010), is far below its manning 
peak of 130,000 uniformed personnel during WWII (Coleman, 2009).  In spite of its 
drastically reduced personnel strength, SOUTHCOM is responsible for 31 countries and 
10 territories, representing about one-sixth of the landmass of the world assigned to 
regional unified commands (SOUTHCOM, 2010). These regions include:  
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a. The land mass of Latin America south of Mexico 
b. The waters adjacent to Central and South America  
c. The Caribbean Sea  
d. A portion of the Atlantic Ocean 
SOUTHCOM is the smallest of all unified command staff, but the dimensions and 
diversity of its areas of responsibility from north to south spans an approximate distance 
of 7,000 miles, and from east to west more than 3,000 miles.  To bring the scope of these 
landmasses to focus, Brazil is larger than the continental United States while Peru is three 
times the size of California—these are just two of the countries SOUTHCOM is 
responsible for (Global Security.org, 2000–2010).  During OUR, personnel requirement 
and responsibility/assignment were critical to the effectiveness of the response effort 
(Clifton, 2010). 
2. Operation Unified Response (OUR)  
As previously defined, OUR is SOUTHCOM’s collaborative humanitarian 
“military” response to the Haiti disaster, which comprised personnel from all branches of 
U.S. military service and commanded by SOUTHCOM. The mission of OUR was 
humanitarian assistance (HA) and disaster relief (DR) operation in support of the U.S. 
government overall response organization, USAID.  OUR provided localized security, 
targeted distribution of aid, restoration of basic human services, medical support, and 
critical engineering services to alleviate human sufferings and facilitate recovery and 
reconstruction of the devastated nation of Haiti.  To effectively perform its mission, OUR 
worked very closely with USAID, which was a part of the international and NGO/PVO 
relief effort, and across its own services lines (Army, Air Force, Navy, Coast Guard), in 
order to forge interagency alliance.  SOUTHCOM’s themes for the Haiti’s HA/DR were 
Teamwork, Unity of Effort, and Enabling Partners (U.S. Army Logistics, 2010). 
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E. SUMMARY 
The literature reviewed in Chapter II was paramount for this team to develop an 
understanding of the effective and ineffective actions of a disaster response operation.  
This helped shape the research team’s opinion of the coordinated efforts between the 
DoD and lead agencies in a disaster response.  The phases of joint operational planning 
are critical when organizing various capabilities to achieve a common objective.  As 
such, the study of these phases has proven to be essential to this team’s analysis of the 
effectiveness of the logistics and contracting efforts of DoD’s response in the first 100 
hours of the 2010 Haitian disaster. This coupled with a knowledge base in Disaster-
Response Logistics and Contingency Contracting helped this team collect, analyze, and 
determine the findings of the information presented in the following chapters.   
Chapter III will disclose the responses to the interview questions presented in 
Chapter I.  An analysis of this feedback will then be provided to answer the primary 
research questions.  The analysis delineated in Chapter III will drive the determinations 
and findings discussed in Chapter IV. 
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III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANALYSIS 
In Chapter I, the researchers developed interview questions to enable them to 
answer the research questions for this project.  These questions were posed to 
participating personnel assigned to DoD organizations, who were in one way or another 
involved in the disaster response operation, Operation Unified response (OUR) in Haiti.  
In this chapter, the researchers will restate the interview questions and use the responses 
provided by the DoD personnel interviewed to analyze the information gathered, in order 
to determine DoD’s response effectiveness during the first 100 hours of OUR, as will be 
discussed in Chapter IV.  Additionally, the researchers utilized information gathered from 
sources like online articles and academic works on contingency contracting and disaster 
response logistics to further evaluate DoD’s effectiveness during those critical 100 hours.   
The researchers believe it is worth mentioning that a majority of the personnel 
interviewed were personnel assigned to SOUTHCOM, which was the lead DoD 
organization for OUR.   Other DoD organizations like FISC, NOLSC, and ACC, which 
were subordinate commands to SOUTHCOM during OUR also provided valuable 
information for this research through materials provided by some members of their staff 
and materials posted on their websites. DoD personnel attached to the above 
organizations who participated in this research provided first hand information that was 
instrumental to the successful completion of this research. However, in gathering 
information from the interviewees, the researchers understood that some personnel may 
be elusive in providing answers and that some of the answers are subjective.  Therefore, 
they supplemented shortfalls in interviewees responses with data collected from the 
above-named sources.   
A. PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS 
There were no mathematical/statistical data collected as the information was 
mainly written documents, personnel views and observations, and expert studies.  Thus, 
the presentation herein referred to is the restatement of the interview questions while the 
analysis will entail using the responses from personnel interviewed to answer the 
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questions the questions.  Where responses are insufficient to analyze fully the interview 
and/or research questions, the researchers would supplement the deficiencies with 
information for sources other than the interviewees. 
In citing the SOUTHCOM personnel interviewed, the researchers devised a 
method to list them by numbers, such as: SOUTHCOM-1 (Contracting), SOUTHCOM-2 
(Fuels), SOUTHCOM-3 (Logistics), for the ease of identification. Information collected 
directly from SOUTHCOM’s website is cited as: SOUTHCOM.  The interview questions 
and analysis are outlined below. For the purpose of this analysis, interview questions are 
denoted by the letters IQ, while the alphabetical letters starting from “a” will be used to 
denote the successive sub-questions to the IQ. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
How Effective Was DoD’s Contracting and Logistics Support To Haiti 
Within the First 100 Hours of the Disaster? 
 
IQ- 1: What were the immediate basic and logistics requirements? 
The immediate basic requirements mirrored the essentials typical of Phase One 
requirements in a contingency operation (e.g., medical services, food, water, shelter, 
security, etc.), as stated in the phases of contingency operation outlined in Chapter II of 
this analysis (Yoder, 2004).  Heavy equipment for construction, barges for port services, 
transportation vehicles, fuel for vehicles, equipment and aircrafts, and mobile phones for 
communications were some of the vital immediate logistics requirements during the first 
100 hours of OUR (Clifton, 2010). 
IQ-1a: How were the requirements determined? 
Initial requirements were determined by USAID, which was the lead U.S. agency 
in the response effort.  However, specific quantities were unknown, because the number 
of casualties and afflicted people were constantly changed during the first 100 hours of 
the operation.  Besides the constantly changing counts, requirements determination was 
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also impacted by the lack of clarity in the supporting and supported command roles.  
SOUTHCOM/USAID initially thought they were supporting NATO, but NATO was 
unclear which organization it supported or if it was indeed the supported organization.  
So there was confusion as to who was the lead organization, which further extended the 
lead times for getting the “right” requirements to the right place at the right time 
(SOUTHCOM-3, 2010). 
IQ-1b: Where these requirements met in a timely fashion? 
No, the requirements did not get to the disaster victims in a timely fashion.  Once 
in country, the logistics necessary for timely delivery of requirements were not in place 
until after the first 100 hours of the operation (Clifton, 2010).  Much of the requirements 
sent to Haiti were delayed in transportation routes such as sea points of debarkation/entry 
(SPOD/SPOE) and/or air points of debarkation/entry (APOD/APOE) in Haiti awaiting 
further transport in country. 
IQ- 2:  What were relief locations available to DoD during OUR? 
The military had supply locations set up for military logistics support in different 
countries as well as on naval vessels.  Although these supply nodes provided supplies like 
tents and personnel (most of which came out of GITMO) for the Haiti relief operation, 
they were not standard SOUTHCOM supply locations and were not outfitted to support 
SOUTHCOM’s mission of directing military forces to help distressed nations in the 
aftermath of a disaster (Clifton, 2010). 
IQ-2a: Were there alternate supply sources where components closest to 
contingency locations (domestic/international) could respond quickly? 
The military indefinite delivery contracts and husbanding contracts were quick 
sources of supplies and services.  Supplies were also taken off naval ships, U.S. embassy 
attaches, and other assets not predesignated or specifically slated to respond to 
contingencies within/close to the SOUTHCOM Area of Operation (AOR).  Other sources 
of supplies were countries like the Dominican Republic, Columbia, as well as foreign 
military, government, institutions and civilian volunteer entities from other countries.  
The Dominican Republic was instrumental in getting supplies and services to Haiti 
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mainly because it shares its eastern boundary with Haiti and there is no water barrier 
between them.  Dominican Republic also has a good economy and was easily accessible. 
2. Secondary Research Question 
How Did Planners and Coordinators of OUR Use Contracting and Logistics 
to Overcome the Devastation That Challenged Their Ability to Provide 
Prompt Relief to Those in Haiti? 
IQ- 3:  How were contracting and logistics efforts coordinated? 
Within the first 100 hours of OUR and throughout much of the time that followed, 
the coordination of efforts between DoD and USAID was a day-to-day endeavor.  A clear 
distinction of responsibilities between the two and other businesses and agencies did not 
exist initially.  Therefore, even though the need for basic requirements such as water, 
food, shelters, heavy equipment and fuel were identified almost immediately, there was 
no guidance as to which agency would meet the requirements (SOUTHCOM, 2010). 
IQ- 3a:  Was there effective command and control? 
Establishing a fully functional command center in Haiti was delayed.  In a joint 
environment, it is critical that a fully functional temporary command post is established 
in the forward operating area within 96 hours of an operation (SOUTHCOM, 2010).  The 
Deployable Joint Command and Control (DJC2) system, embedded with an early entry 
configuration, enables a commander to rapidly deploy such a command.  Although the 
DJC2 arrived in Haiti within 48 hours of OUR, it was not fully functional until 10 days 
into OUR, due largely in part to the heavy debris and harsh environmental conditions of 
Haiti (SOUTHCOM, 2010).  The delay adversely impacted the synchronization of efforts 




IQ-3b:  At what point were tasks and responsibilities assigned? 
SOUTHCOM assigned tasks during the first 100 hours to its service components 
and published operations/task directives.  SOUTHCOM personnel also issued 
Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO) to modify or change portions of original operations to suit 
required tasks assigned to service components (SOUTHCOM, 2010). 
IQ-3c:  Was prior training conducted to prepare first responder for their 
assigned responsibilities? 
SOUTHCOM champions Emergency Operation Centers, which is a multinational 
disaster preparedness effort comprising disaster preparedness exercises, seminars, and 
conferences for increased collaboration with partner nations to improve their collective 
abilities to respond effectively and expeditiously to disasters.  SOUTHCOM also trains 
U.S. military personnel to effectively response to victims of storms, earthquakes, and 
other natural disasters (SOUTHCOM, 2010).   
IQ-3d:  Were contracting and logistics personnel integrated into  
operational planning phase (OPLAN)? 
SOUTHCOM logisticians were involved in the OPLAN phase of disaster 
response but the need to involve contracting personnel at the OPLAN level was not 
apparent, especially since local contracting effort is considered a USAID activity during 
contingencies (Clifton, 2010).  DoD contracting support was conducted mainly in 
CONUS and contracting requirement was not integrated into the OPLAN as a critical 
element for immediate response operation.  NAVSOUTH, the navy component of 
SOUTHCOM, had a very small logistics shop but it had no contracting officers, so in this 
case, there was no contracting officer to integrate into the OPLAN.  NAVSOUTH had no 
apparent need for contracting during the initial phase of OUR and if it did, it would 
request contracting support from other Navy commands (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010).   
Notwithstanding the appearance that contracting personnel are not critical to 
OPLAN for contingency operations, it is imperative that contracting personnel be 
identified and assigned, not only at the onset of disaster relief operations, but prior, as this 
will guarantee prompt and adequate contracting support during contingency operations.  
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Having contracting personnel pre-assigned and involved in Phase Zero would facilitate 
specific effective plan development and establishment of pre-awarded contracts such as 
IDIQs and MAC, specifically tailored to the different types of disasters, different 
geographic locations, and different population needs (Yoder, 2010).   
Given that contracting at the local level was not SOUTHCOM’s primary 
responsibility in Haiti, it was unable to immediately contract for support equipments, 
debris clearing, logistics, etc., without support from other military components.  In view 
of the grim circumstances in Haiti, local contractors could only provide limited amount of 
requirements.  The increased contract award timelines, lack of pre-awarded (disaster 
response) contracts and insufficient prepositioning of response requirements, added to the 
delay in providing expeditious contracting and logistics support. 
3. Tertiary Research Questions 
What Contracting Support and Processes Were Utilized During OUR and 
Was There Sufficient Contracts Oversight and Administration Given the 
Extreme Circumstances in Haiti? 
 
IQ-4:  What were the contracting support requirements? 
According to U.S. Navy Captain Vincent P. Clifton, who was on the ground in 
Haiti, there was theoretically no requirements for contracting support during the first 100 
hours of OUR, DoD contracting support became effective afterwards (Clifton, 2010).  
Since combatant commanders usually do not have procurement authority, there was a 
delay in designating a lead contracting support component during the response phase of 
OUR.  Thus, even though the U.S. Army Contracting Officer from the Army 410 
Brigade, was on ground within the first 48 hours (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010).  This delay 
increased procurement lead times, procurement costs, and shifted several requirements 
delivery schedules. 
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IQ-4a:  How were these requirements determined? 
U.S. Army Lieutenant General, P.K. Keen, the commanding general of the Joint 
Task Force-Haiti (JTF-H), who is also the Deputy Commander of SOUTHCOM, 
determined that contracting support was needed and subsequently, the Joint Operation 
Contract Support Planner (JOCSP) was initiated for contracting support in Haiti.  The 
Army 87th Airborne, with approximately 20 personnel, deployed with field agents to 
conduct micro purchases within the first seven days.  Army Lieutenant Colonel, Doug 
Lowery, was designated head of contracting activity in Haiti (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010).     
IQ-4b:  Were there pre-awarded contracts in place prior to the disaster? 
DoD pre-awarded contracts that were in place during OUR were IDIQ type 
contracts such as: Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), Navy’s Global 
Contingency Logistics Contract (GCLS), Global Contingency Construction (GCCC)/ 
Navy Facility Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Air Force Contract Augmentation 
Program (AFCAP), and Husbanding Contracts.  Although these contracts aided quick 
response, most of the contracts were not reviewed prior to the disaster to ensure the 
contract covered the scope of work required.   Most of these contracts became useful later 
in the operation, during reconstruction efforts but not in the first 100 hours of OUR.  
Also, executing the pre-existing contracts was very expensive (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010). 
IQ-4C:   What were the contract types? 
Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contracts through commercial sources was the main type 
of contract used during the response phase of OUR.  As outlined in the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12.207 (a)  contract type, contracting agencies shall 
use firm-fixed-price contracts … for the acquisition of commercial items, except it is 
necessary for them to use Time-and-Material and Labor-hour contracts.  FFP contracts 
afford the government fewer risks than other forms of contracts; FFP is also the 
prescribed contract type for procuring commercial products.  Using FFP in Haiti was in 
accordance with FAR. 
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IQ-4d:  Was there adequate competition in awarding the contracts? 
FAR Part 6.101 requires that contracting officers promote and provide for full and 
open competition in soliciting offers and awarding government contracts, except when 
limitations described in FAR Subparts 6.2 and 6.3 apply.  In Haiti, there was little or no 
competition because most of the local contractors were displaced and/or disoriented by 
the earthquake and there were very few qualified contractors available and willing to 
compete for, and provide supplies and services.  Where competition existed, it was more 
often than not “teaming” between one or two vendors who more than likely worked as 
one team (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010).  In a different environment and under normal 
circumstances, such “teaming” by contractors would be classified as “collusion” (FAR 
Part 3. 3), and will be grounds to disqualify the contractors involved.  However, in Haiti, 
this was one of the restrictions that could be bypassed based on the directives in FAR 
6.302, which permits contracting without full and open competition, in order to get 
resources to the customers in a timely manner. 
IQ-4e:  What contracting methods and procedures were utilized? 
The contracting methods and procedures used in Haiti were mainly commercial 
contracts that included Simplified Acquisition Procedure (SAP), Indefinite Delivery, 
Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ), Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) and Letter Contracts 
(SOUTHCOM-1, 2010).  FAR 13.003 (a) authorizes contracting agencies to use SAP to 
the maximum extent practicable for all purchases of supplies or services not exceeding 
the simplified acquisition threshold.  The SAP threshold for contingency operations was 
capped at $12 Million.  SAP requires the use of government purchase card (FAR 13.001), 
however, local contractors in Haiti did not have the capability to accept U.S. government 
purchase cards, therefore, most of the purchases made within the first 100 hours were 
paid for with cash (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010).  Using cash as a means of payment made it 
difficult for the DoD contracting personnel in Haiti to effectively follow SAP procedures 
to its full extent (FAR 13) and there is less oversight when cash is used as a form of 
payment.   
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The IDIQ contracts can be used to acquire supplies and/or services when the exact 
times or exact quantities of future deliveries are unknown at the time of contract award 
(FAR Part16.501).  In Haiti, the exact type of items, quantities, and delivery requirements 
were unknown during the first 100 hours, so immediate utilization of IDIQ contracts was 
not possible.  FAR 13.303-1 describes BPA as a simplified method of filling anticipated 
repetitive needs for supplies or services by establishing “charge accounts’’ with qualified 
sources of supply, thus, the use of BPA procedure and issuing of IDIQ contracts 
prevented the writing of numerous purchase orders, which could be challenging during 
crisis situations such as the Haiti earthquake.   
IQ-4f:  How were contracts negotiated and awarded? 
During the first 100 hours, the main form of negotiation was “verbal.”  There was 
neither enough time, nor the infrastructure to conduct proper solicitations, negotiations, 
and/or contract awards.  The Contracting officer discussed the contracts with vendors, 
collected resource information from each vendor, assessed vendor’s ability to meet 
government requirements, and awarded the contracts to the most qualified contractor 
based on verbal agreements and without the usual formulized contracting evaluation and 
source selection practices (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010).   
Verbal solicitations are not prohibited by law or regulation; however, in 
conducting oral solicitations, contracting officers are required to establish and maintain 
records of oral price quotations in order to show with clarity, the propriety of placing the 
order at the price paid with the supplier concerned.  In Haiti, maintaining such 
documentation was challenging as contracting efforts were driven by urgency of needs 
and constantly changing requirements determinations.  In most cases, the contracting 
officer may only have to show the names of the suppliers contacted and the prices and 
other terms and conditions quoted by each supplier (FAR Part 13.106-3 (b) (1)).    
IQ-5:  Was there adequate contract administration and contracts oversight? 
Tracking, coordination, and control effort was assigned to SOUTHCOM but 
SOUTHCOM did not immediately have good visibility of what was being purchased 
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within the first 100 hours- neither could it accurately assess its overall operation as things 
were happening too quickly (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010).  Subsequently, the Army 
contracting component published the JAB to aid in requirements determination and to 
identify the immediate needs of DoD personnel in Haiti.   
The Army Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) also used the 
Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) to provide contractor 
oversight during the Haiti relief effort.  SPOT is the Joint Enterprise contractor 
management and accountability system that gives government representatives oversight 
of contractors during contingencies.  It is a central source of contingency contractor 
information and contractors are required to maintain accountability by name within 
SPOT (BTA, 2010).  In Haiti, SPOT was set up to track contractors’ movements and 
activities.  Contractors were required to provide input to SPOT within five days of 
contract award.  However, implementing SPOT in Haiti was very difficult due to the 
chaos created by the disaster.  Contractors and some DoD personnel also lacked training 
and SPOT guidelines were not easy to follow.  Additionally, the number of contractors to 
move was substantially high.  Contractors showed up without notice and very quickly, 
there were more contractors than DoD officials, which made monitoring their movements 
and/or providing adequate oversight for the was a daunting task for the contracting 
personnel (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010). 
Overall, there were contract administration, management, and oversight processes 
as well as Quality Assurance in place during the Haiti disaster response operation, but it 
was not until the later phases of the operation that they were fully established.  Defense 
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 
representatives were somewhat involved in SOUTHCOM contingency planning phase 
because they only attended the Contract Community Board (CCB) daily meetings to 
provide counseling and guidance.  Their expertise was not utilized for Haiti’s contracts 
administration because there was supposedly no need for such oversight.  DCAA effort 
was also not required for pricing (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010). 
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4. Additional Interview Question #1 
What Were the Contracting and Logistics Challenges? 
 
IQ-6:  What were the contracting and logistics challenges? 
During the response phase, DoD personnel had to overcome several challenges, 
most of which are common in every disaster response effort.  Logistics and contracting 
challenges delayed the delivery of supplies and services to disaster victims.  Command 
and Control (C2), communication, proper identification of supporting and supported 
command structures and manpower constraints were some common logistics challenges.  
The lack of C2 and the difficulty involved in indentifying who was being supported and 
by whom, led to ineffective coordination between relief personnel and delays in tasks 
assignments and getting requirements to disaster victims. SOUTHCOM being the 
smallest of all COCOMs did not have enough manpower to provide the amount of 
assistance require.  Therefore, it had to recruit additional personnel from all the services 
to augment its manning shortfalls. 
IQ-6a:  What was the impact of “information gathering” personnel on OUR? 
During the first one hundred hours, DoD personnel, private citizens and interest 
groups flooded Haiti in search of first-hand information and lessons learned. The 
presence of these “information gathering” personnel was more distractive than supportive 
of the response operation.  Their presence shadowed the urgency to provide much needed 
aid to disaster victims, which was paramount during the initial response phase, and as 
such personnel attempting to gather information for lessons learned were 
counterproductive.  Also, personnel outside of the immediate operational chain of 
command were using information from media groups like Cable News Network (CNN) 
and/or relying on outdated briefs to determine requirements.  Since the situation and 
requirements changed daily and in some cases, hourly, such inaccurate information 
created an overwhelming influx of the “wrong” supplies due to misrepresentations of 
actual requirements needed in Haiti (Clifton, 2010).   
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IQ-6b:  What were the transportation challenges? 
The flow of goods and services was throughout the supply chain was constrained 
in the last mile of transport.  Damage and debris caused by the earthquake rendered some 
of the roads impassable.  Some roads had developmental challenges prior to the 
earthquake and they further complicated transportation issues. The few roads that were 
passable were occupied by displaced Haitians living on the streets amidst debris, 
preventing trucks carrying relief and food supplies from reaching distribution sites 
(USAID, 2010).  Haiti’s major seaports were damaged and its other port was under 
construction and neither was functional nor usable for port operations.  U.S.’ ships and 
ships belonging to other countries flooded the damaged ports, making offload of goods 
and services more challenging.  Also, Haiti’s only airstrip was damaged and had to be 
revamped for limited use.   Unlike the issues with limited transportation routes, air traffic 
was everything but limited.  Prior to the earthquake,  the typical landing and recovery 
operation at the Haiti airstrip was less than 20 airplanes daily, during OUR, over 100 
airplanes landed, or attempted to land in Haiti’s damaged and inadequate airport, daily.  
This caused delays and/or cancellations of several flights and many of the relief 
personnel and supplies inbound Haiti had to wait several days for transportation (Clifton, 
2010). 
IQ-6c:  What Challenges did alternate transportation routes present? 
Alternate transportation routes were created to expedite movement of supplies.  
However, these routes were often unsecure, resulting in the pilferage of many items.  
Corrupt Customs and some other Haiti’s government officials seeking kickbacks added to 
the pilferage and break in accountability of supply chains.  In extreme cases, some of 
Haiti’s Majors and other government officials shut down roads and distribution points if 
bribes and kickbacks were not paid to them  (SOUTHCOM-3, 2010).  
The route from Santo Domingo to Port-au-Prince was reportedly passable, 
though bottlenecks due to relief traffic were creating delays of up to one 
hour at the border crossing point; also disorganized relief convoys caused 
further delays. The U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) recently reported a transit time of up to 18 hours. Thus U.N. 
Logistics Cluster requested that the Government of the Dominican  
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Republic (GoDR) establish a humanitarian hub in Barahona as an alternate 
for channeling humanitarian relief cargo from Santo Domingo to Haiti 
(USAID, 2010). 
IQ-6d:  How did fuel shortages impact transportation? 
Fuel shortage and the downed Haiti refinery added to transportation challenges.  
Getting fuel to Haiti to supply equipment and transportation vehicles was logistically 
challenging as well.  Haiti refinery eventually opened and became operational; however, 
it was undermanned and its personnel worked 24 hours shifts with one-hour turnover.  
Refinery personnel, including its directors also used the office spaces for storage and 
shelter.   
IQ-6e:  What challenges did pull system operative in Haiti create? 
Operating push systems, which is supplying with little regard for demand data, in 
Haiti rather than the more effective pull system, which is supplying with a greater regard 
for demand data, essentially equated to providing the “wrong supplies” at the right time.  
Many items showed up in Haiti that were neither requested nor properly marked for 
delivery and distribution.  Relief personnel had to move these items from their respective 
ports of entry, label them and provide storage for them.  There were so much (wrong) 
supplies arriving in Haiti that relief personnel ran out of storage spaces.  Supplies piled 
on the ground, creating a different kind of debris that exacerbated the relief operation.  
Clearing the debris caused by the earthquake was tedious enough without having to 
dispose of unwanted supplies.  Response personnel and DoD supply expediters must be 
properly trained so they can effectively determine the right requirements for the type of 
disaster and population they respond to.  Prior planning is a key to success during disaster 
relief. 
Early planning will reveal that every disaster does not require the same type of 
response, therefore the type of disaster and the areas affected should determine early prior 
to pushing supplies to a disaster location.  For instance, there was strong push for more 
water to be sent to Haiti, not considering that every part of Haiti was not affected by the 
earthquake and it did not take very long to get the local water supply running.  People 
continued to push water to Haiti in great quantities that there was so much water in Haiti, 
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some Haitians were washing their cars with OUR bottled water- making it hard for the 
average mom-and-pop shops could not sell their water (Clifton, 2010).   
The media was one of the culprits for this overage in supply, there were constant 
advertisements in the media for urgent requirements and supply of water to Haitians, and 
many relief organizations responded accordingly.  It is imperative that response personnel 
are properly trained on disaster response processes to plan effectively for logistics and 
supplies requirements prior to and during disaster relief operations.  Excess water 
supplied clogged the logistics pipelines to the extent that finding enough storage space 
for bottled water became a challenge (Clifton, 2010). 
Haiti’s close proximity to South America, other Caribbean Islands, and the U.S. 
was a clear indication that a “pull” supply chain management system would be effective. 
However, many organizations and private entities failed to listen to personnel on ground 
and they continued the push of unnecessary requirements to Haiti.  Unrequested supplies 
clogged distribution channels and prevented the right requirements from reaching the 
disaster victims.  Pushing supplies to Haiti without request or without the consult of 
personnel on the ground was equally challenging as supplies began to land in Haiti in 
numbers disproportional to the number of personnel involved in the relief effort and the 
amount of staging areas available for the supplies was inadequate.   
IQ-6f:  What was the impact of lack of visibility on OUR? 
Getting the right supplies to Haiti was crucial to a successful relief operation.  
One factor that contributed to inadequate requirements determination was the lack of 
visibility on the supplies on ground, the supplies in the supply pipelines, and the supplies 
that needed to be requisitioned.  There was no central information hub to provide a 
complete picture of what supplies and service capabilities were already in theater or in 
the supply pipeline and what was needed.  When SOUTHCOM finally conducted its 
assessment, it realized that there were too many supplies inbound to Haiti and it had to 
stop some of the shipments since they were not the right supplies and there was no 
storage for them- a move that in itself created an additional task.  Additionally, poorly  
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managed supply chains and the lack of visibility of the supplies provided by other 
agencies like the World Food Program (WFP) exacerbated the visibility challenges 
(SOUTHCOM-3, 2010). 
IQ-6g:  How did donations of wrong items impact the response operation? 
Well-intentioned civilians and other government and foreign entities donated 
huge quantities of items like bags of rice, couch, plates, pans, coats, etc., to the disaster 
victims.  In spite of the good intentions behind such donations, these items were not 
suitable for meeting the immediate needs of the disaster victims; rather, they took up 
storage space and created more work for the relief personnel.  The victims needed items 
like premade meals, not uncooked rice.  Not knowing what donations were coming in 
through donations adversely affected effective requirements determination.  The process 
for transporting and delivering donated items was also not clearly understood.  Relief 
personnel created their own transportation processes, which further complicated 
distribution effort. 
IQ-6h:  What were the challenges of excessive number of relief personnel? 
The endless arrival of uninvited, but good-intentioned, relief personnel was a 
challenge closely linked with ineffective requirements determination.  These personnel 
usually showed up in Haiti without any support mechanism in place, so they, like the 
disaster victims required security, supplies and services like the disaster victims.  With 
their ever-increasing presence, DoD and USAID had to continually reassess and redefine 
the type and amount of support needed for the response operation.  This also made 
establishing a pull flow for logistics support extremely difficult (Clifton, 2010).  
IQ-6i:  What is the impact of distribution challenges to the timely response 
effort? 
Effective determining of distribution nodes, accurate count of the population at 
each node and knowing how the amount of supplies required at the nodes are critical to 
providing timely relief.  USAID had warehouses located worldwide and the proximity of 
Haiti to SOUTHCOM and other supply sources like Dominican Republic made getting 
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supplies to Haiti a lot quicker than if Haiti was farther away from the U.S.  However, 
distributing the supplies and providing adequate security post serious challenges to 
response teams.  Transportation issues as detailed above and other issues like improper 
labeled/unlabeled items made distribution effort even more time consuming.   
Poor identification of rations also slowed the distribution process.  For instance, 
there were two major types of rations delivered to Haiti: USAID Humanitarian 
Assistance Disaster Meal (HADM) and the military Meals Ready to Eat (MRE).  The 
HADM had 1,200 calories, issued one HDM per day, per Haitian while the MRE had 
2000 calories per meal, issued three times a day per service member.  It was critical to 
properly label the meals so that there were no mix-ups in distribution.  When distributing 
items donated by civilian entities, SOUTHCOM had to be very careful not to mix them 
up with military supplies to prevent the perception that U.S. personnel were using 
donated items.  Sorting through the enormous supplies of donated and improperly labeled 
items increased workloads and extended delivery times.  Timeliness, therefore, was more 
of a distribution issue than the issue of arrival of supply and services.  Failure to properly 
label supplies led to ration shortages for military members and overages for the Haitians.  
Proper distribution of rations required a distribution plan, organized distribution, and a 
functioning distribution process (Clifton, 2010). 
IQ-6J:  What were the other challenges encountered by DoD response teams? 
Security was very critical to the response effectiveness.  Providing adequate 
security for relief personnel and disaster victims, as well clearing of debris to situate tents 
and Fleet Hospitals (FH), were two other challenges that adversely impacted OUR.  
Finding adequate space to situate the fleet hospitals was very challenging because the FH 
required larger areas to accommodate beds and surgery rooms (Clifton, 2010).  Another 
challenge was insufficient cash for on-the-spot purchases.  Contracting personnel did not 
have enough cash money to make required purchases.  Although, IDIQs contracts were 
available in Haiti, they were capped at $25 Million so contracting personnel avoided 
using them so they do not exceed the limit (SOUTHCOM-1, 2010).    
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With the challenges presented by broken infrastructures, dislocation of providers 
of supplies and services, lack of pre-awarded contracts, (Clifton, 2010) and in the absence 
of clearly defined responsibilities, there was heightened risk of adding complexity to an 
already volatile disaster-response chain of logistics caused by infusing the system with 
unsuitable requirements (Apte, 2009).  Without detailed provisions in the first phase of 
the operation and to avoid delaying relief to Haiti, several relief efforts to fulfill 
requirements were duplicated.  These challenges created huge backlogs at ports of entries 
(POE) to Haiti and mass confusion for responders on the ground in Haiti (Clifton, 2010). 
5. Additional Interview Question #2 
Were There Performance Measurement Challenges? 
 
IQ-7:  What challenges did performance measurement pose during OUR? 
In measuring performance, one has to know what is required, when, how much of 
it is required and the intended use.  During OUR, measuring performance was very 
challenging as no standard performance measurement system was in place.  The urgency 
of the need to deliver aid to the disaster victims was paramount to measuring how well 
the job was performed (Clifton, 2010).  In general, humanitarian relief organizations have 
focused more on job accomplishments than on performance measurements.  
Nevertheless, years of trial and error have generated greater emphasis on performance 
outcomes as organizations strive to manage more effective and efficient disaster relief 
operations.  Selecting the proper performance measurement standard is one of the most 
intricate steps in the development of performance measurement systems.  The extensive 
variety and depth to which a performance measure characterizes a process is what makes 
the selection so difficult (Davidson, 2006).  The following paragraphs detail some of the 
challenges of performance measurement that impacted the effectiveness of OUR. 
IQ-7a: Lack of standardization 
In Haiti, selecting a standardized means of measuring performance was not 
accomplished due to issues like lack of standardized definition of performance 
measurement, lack of coordination, lack of visibility, and the overwhelming push supply 
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system.  Moreover, different organizations have different ways of measuring 
performance.  The U.S. air force may measure performance as takeoff and landing 
sorties; Helicopters (Helos) squadrons may measure it as hours flown, while others 
organizations measured performance differently from the two.   
Most of the items pushed into Haiti from several countries had different units of 
issue.  Items were issued in liters, gallons, five gallons, bottles, containers, etc; however, 
in counting these items, their units of measurements were often overlooked.  There were 
times when personnel could not quantify certain items.  For example, aircraft carriers 
made and supplied water to Haiti, but there was no standard means of quantifying the 
amount of water supplied by the carriers and no standard unit of issue was established 
(Clifton, 2010).  In such situations, compiling the quantity of items supplied without 
converting them to one standard unit of issue will obscure accurate performance 
measurements and create inefficiencies if such measurements are applied to other 
processes.   
IQ-7b: Measuring misaligned responsibilities 
The effectiveness is the degree to which a process meets an objective, while 
efficiency is the quantitative value of resources expended to achieve an objective 
(Beamon, 2004).  Meeting a disaster response objective requires coordination of effort 
and a clear command and control system that would provide guidance and alignment of 
tasks assignments and responsibilities.  These objectives should be clearly outlined and 
performance measurement standards established during Phase Zero planning.   
Ineffective Phase Zero planning creates issues like misaligned responsibilities, 
which can critically hinder accurate performance measurement initiatives and the 
effectiveness of an operation.   For instance, in Haiti, a helicopter squadron flew several 
hours, some of which were not properly aligned to OURs objectives.   A pressing 
question is, how would this squadron effectively measure its performances?  Would it 
measure the number of hours flown, even though those hours were misaligned to the JTF 
requirements?  In another instance, personnel provided assistances that were not  
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requested, while others dropped off items without ensuring that they got to the end users.  
How did they measure performance?  Should they measure performance on requirements 
that never made it to the end users?   
The challenge in performance measurement of disaster response logistics arises 
from the complexity of the supply chain and the extent of organizational control, in 
addition to the traditional difficulties of what to measure and how to measure it (Beamon, 
2004).  These misalignments of efforts are performance measurement challenges 
indicative of ineffective command and control, poor communication, and lack of unity of 
efforts.  Prior training and proper Phase Zero planning is a key to meeting this objective. 
IQ-7c:  How does trade-offs in performance measurements impact resource 
management? 
The resources of a disaster response operation are measured in regard to the 
speed, cost, and accuracy with which they are deployed.  These are trade-offs that require 
a systemic process of measurement to effectively manage resources (Davidson, 2006).  
This issue associated with balancing trade-offs are strikingly similar between the 
commercial sector and non-government organizations (NGO), such that some 
commercial processes are applicable to humanitarian logistics.  However, NGOs have a 
distinct set of challenges when it comes to supply chain management.  Many of the 
unique challenges NGOs encounter such as surge deployments and other rapid response 
missions are organic to the military, an observance of the similarities of the three sectors 
is significant in order to understand the fundamental principles of the performance-
measurement systems for humanitarian logistics (Davidson, 2006).  DoD was able to get 
personnel on ground very quickly, but it was ineffective in determining the right number 
of support personnel.  The overcut in resources created an excess of DoD responders and 
the supplies of unnecessary items, leading to overspending.  
IQ-7d: How was throughput measured? 
Throughput is output relative to input: the amount passing through a system from 
input to output…over a period of time (Princeton University-WordNet, 2010). Therefore, 
measuring throughput in a disaster-ridden environment requires a clear understanding of 
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requirements, effective communication of performance standards and measurements 
among those providing relief and a clear visibility of the requirements and proper supply 
change management.   In Haiti, some of these critical challenges were not addressed until 
well past the first 100 hours of OUR.    
C. SUMMARY  
This chapter provided detailed insight into DoD’s response operation to the 
disaster in Haiti.  It answered the case study interview questions developed by the 
researchers, showed logistics and contracting requirements and how DoD orchestrated 
the efforts of several key players and utilized their capabilities during OUR.  The chapter 
also revealed some of the challenges that hampered DoD’s effectiveness in providing 
vital necessities to aid Haitians affected by the earthquake and how the lack of 
standardized performance measures impact the effectiveness of the response effort. 
The research analysis reveals that although no two disasters are the same, most of 
the basic contracting and logistics requirements are similar for DoD personnel providing 
the relief effort as well as the disaster victims during the critical phase of the response, 
the first 100 hours.  Getting these basic necessities to them requires effective control, 
coordination, communication and unity of effort.  The lack of coordination, Command 
and Control (C2), and communication created series of logistics and contracting 
chokeholds for the relief personnel, making logistics efforts like transportation, debris 
clearing, delivery and distribution of supplies and services more tasking.   Furthermore, 
not having an up and running contracting component further delayed the response effort.    
Bottlenecks created by these logistics and contracting challenges were tough on 
the response operation and adversely impacted DoD’s response effectiveness during the 
first most critical 100 hours of the operation.   
In Chapter IV, the researchers determine whether DoD’s response effort was 
efficient.  The chapter also develops a logistics and contracting model that—together 
with the YTTM—integrate those capabilities into Phase Zero of DR life cycle to enhance 
DoD’s response effectiveness.  
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IV. DETERMINATIONS FROM ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the researchers determined from their analysis in Chapter III, that 
contracting and logistics support to Haiti within the first 100 hours of the disaster was not 
optimum effective.  The researchers found that a delay in establishing a functioning 
command and control (C2) was an overarching contributor to DoD’s less-than effective 
response effort in Haiti.  The cascading impact of C2 on the effectiveness of OUR are as 
follows: 
1. Ineffective Communication (COMMS)  
2. Lack of coordination of effort (COE) 
3. Misalignment of tasks with Operational Goal 
4. Inadequate Situational Awareness 
The delayed establishment of C2 diminished clear lines of communications 
among DoD responders; as a result, much of the contracting and logistics effort were not 
effectively coordinated, leading to misalignments of individual component tasks with 
operational goal, and subsequently, inadequate situational awareness.  Without sufficient 
situational awareness showing the extensive scale of Haiti disaster, the C2 component 
was unable to effectively coordinate the response effort.   
The researchers further determined that SOUTHCOM did not sufficiently preplan 
and/or create an organization structure tailored to handle disasters of extensive 
magnitudes.  SOUTHCOM’s organizational structure was designed to facilitate 
interagency collaboration; however, the scale of Haiti earthquake disaster challenged its 
ability to support the effort (GAO Report, 2010).  A proper Phase Zero planning and the 
utilization of the Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM) for credentialing and integrating 
contingency contracting officers into DoD’s operational plans (Yoder, 2004) is critical 
for effective response, especially during the first 100 hours of a disaster.   
Since the YTTM was specifically tailored towards contingency contracting 
operations, the researchers developed the Stella’s Future Model for Contracting and 
 48
Logistics (SFMCL), titled after one of the researchers, as the logisticians parallel to the 
YTTM (Obayuwana, 2010).  The SFMCL shortened, as Stella’s Future Model (SFM) 
will ensure that logisticians are adequately credentialed and incorporated, at the 
appropriate levels, into OPLAN.  Also, it will utilize the YTTM credentialing system to 
assign specific contracting support responsibilities required for DR operation.  The 
YTTM credentialing with respect to DR contracting support is discussed in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) 
SOUTHCOM’s support to the disaster relief efforts in Haiti revealed weaknesses 
in its structure that initially hindered its efforts to conduct a large-scale military 
operation. Specifically, the structure lacked a division to address planning for operations 
occurring over thirty days to one year in duration.  In addition, the command’s logistics 
function was sub-optimized and had difficulty providing supply and engineering support 
to the relief effort (GAO Report, 2010).  The delays in establishing a fully functional C2 
center for the Joint Task force- Haiti (JTF-H) during OUR adversely affected the logistics 
functions.  Requirements for trained and qualified personnel, distribution points and 
routes, security and rules of engagement (ROE) are just a few of the parameters driven by 
C2.  Monitoring and adapting for changes with key performance parameters indicative of 
command and control (C2), communication, and transportation are some critical factors 
in the management of disaster-response logistics and thus, the success of HA/DR 
operations.  
During the initial phase of OUR all Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) 
personnel were not deployed as such, but instead were assigned to other areas, and this 
created gaps in capability and structure during the establishment of the JTF Headquarters 
(HQ) for Haiti (SOUTHCOM, 2010).  The absence of a valid Joint Manning Document 
(JMD) caused skilled planners to be assigned to more menial tasks, rather than the tasks 
they are trained to perform, thus, underutilizing their expertise.  When key personnel 
and/or skill sets are not identified at Phase Zero or employed effectively throughout an 
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operation, the full implementation of the DR/HA logistics2 process becomes 
proportionately difficult to achieve (Thomas, 2005), this deficiency was revealed in the 
first 100 hours of OUR.  
The disaster stricken environment of Haiti created a risk of civil unrest and 
criminal activity, which was potentially threatening to the U.S., international forces, and 
civilians involved in the relief effort.  As such, the logistic distribution points and routes 
required security but that level of security needed standing and supplemental rules of 
engagement (ROE) tailored to a HA/DR operation, as opposed to combat environments.  
Since ROE is a functionality of C2, an ROE specific to OUR was subsequently delayed 
and remained unpublished until about 10 days after the operation was initiated 
(SOUTHCOM, 2010).  Thus, the control of the flow of logistics suffered with increased 
disorder and pilferage, due largely in part to volatile security procedures with respect to 
an inconsistent ROE.  Therefore, the effective execution and management of the logistics 
process was hindered in the absence of steadfast security measures resultant of delayed 
C2 functionality. 
One repercussion of the late establishment of C2 besides those listed above, 
occurred when Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) from the Army Expeditionary 
Contract Command (ECC) arrived in Haiti and found no established C2 in place.  The 
ECC personnel had to rely heavily on the Embassy and other units/agencies for support 
services.  Without the basic essentials to endure the harsh conditions, nor the proper 
resources to support HA/DR missions, it was apparent that a Contingency Contracting 
Deployment Package (CCDP)/Early Entry Equipment were necessary.  The resources 
required for a CCO to support HA/DR operations are determined based on several 
factors: 
•   Level and complexity of Contracting Effort 
•   Number of Forces supported (Army - Boots-On-Ground) 
•   Representation from more than one service 
                                                 
2 “HA: The process of planning, implementing, and controlling the efficient, cost effective, flow and 
storage of goods and materials, as well as related information, from the point of origin to the point of 
consumption for the purpose of meeting the end beneficiary’s requirements” (Thomas, 2005). 
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•   Involvement of State Dept., USAID, Political, Socio-Economic climate 
•   Common Contracting Operation Picture 
•   Establishment of a General Officer Level Task Force and Oversight 
Establishing a CDDP based on METT-TC3 for each phase of an operation would 
offer the on-scene Contingency Contracting Team the resources necessary to support 
HA/DR operations in the absence of a fully functional C2 (Army ECC, 2010). 
Another repercussion of the delayed establishment of a functional C2 was two-
fold: first, supporting commands were unable to fully understand who they supported, 
and second, supporting commands would either dictated or attempted to dictate their own 
activities in the absence of guidance from the commands in which were to support 
(Clifton, 2010).  One specific example of a command attempting to operate outside of the 
realm of the supported and a possible case of misaligned tasks, involves a navy vessel 
whose supplies were rejected by the JTF-H because there was already excess supplies on 
ground.  This vessel reached beyond the operational chain of command to the 
administrative chain of command, in an attempt to overturn the order from the JTF.  This 
created more work for the supported command and further complicated USAID/DoD 
drive to coordinate all efforts.  This is a C2 deficiency that appears to span a broader 
scope than deficiencies in the response operation- this is indicative of the different 
branches of service not properly aligning their individual component goals with joint 
operation objectives.  This consequently limits effective communication and coordination 
of efforts between DoD responders during contingency operations.  The YTTM and SFM 
provide the means for proper integration and alignment of skills and contingency 
operational goals regardless of the branch of service leading the operation.   
B. IMPACT OF C2 ON OUR EFFECTIVENESS 
As identified above, the following factors individually addressed below were the 
cascading impact of the delayed establishment of C2. 
                                                 
3 METT-TC is an acronym used by the Army of the United States to help commanders remember and 
prioritize what to analyze during the planning phase of any operation.  It stands for Mission, Enemy, 
Terrain, Troops available, Time, and Civilian considerations. (Army ECC, 2010). 
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1. Ineffective Communication   
In Haiti, teams like the contract community board (CCB) convened and 
communicated via telephone within the first few hours of the disaster and continued as 
regularly as possible thereafter, so each component could share Situation Reports 
(SITREP) and provide situational awareness (Clifton, 2010).  Also, SOUTHCOM 
deployed the All Partners Access Network (APAN)4 developed by U.S. Pacific 
Command (PACOM), in addition to communication tools like the Blogger Roundtables, 
as a communication tool for collaborating and providing timely assistance to the victims 
in Haiti (Lawlor, 2010).    Although these communication tools aided coordination of 
efforts, there was a shortage of cellular phones (Clifton, 2010), which were necessary for 
communication and APAN was still in its developmental stage (Lawlor, 2010), and it did 
not provide detailed information on the mission accomplished by each DoD’s component.  
One major problem with tools like the APAN, is that the information was mostly useless 
because it showed that work was performed, but it did not give explanation of how the 
mission was accomplished (Galrahn, 2010). 
Most critically, effective communication was hindered by the lack of a fully 
functioning C2, which impacted the coordination of both logistics and contract support.   
Without a fully functioning command center intact, communications for logistics 
coordination between the points of origin and consumption were none existent in the first 
100 hours of OUR.  Supplies were pouring into Haiti via seaport, airport, and land, 
mainly from the neighboring Dominican Republic with most of the deliveries eluding the 
chain of command.  The uncertainty of supply is a major challenge for disaster-response 
logistics (Apte, 2009), and this held true for the contracting and logistics coordinators in 
Haiti.  Conventional intra-agency communications are practical within simple logistics  
 
 
                                                 
4 The Transnational Information Sharing Cooperation (TISC)—the name of the newest version of the 
All Partners Access Network (APAN)—was developed by the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) for 
communicating with Asia-Pacific countries.  TISC was tested in Haitian crisis- APAN is a tool for 
collaboration to get things done and get them done quickly… APAN has translator capability which 
enables citizens of different nations to see conversations in their own languages…(Lawlor, 2010).  
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systems; however, disaster networks are asymmetric, which require strict inter-agency 
coordination to effectively manage and distribute supplies and equipment processed 
through the system. 
Better communications with Army ECC HQ could have stimulated oversight of 
high dollar contract actions.  Major contracts were written by Contingency Contracting 
Officers (CCO), some of whom required additional guidance.  An adjustment of the 
contract review threshold would probably benefit the contracting effort and warrants 
should be issued based upon the CCO experience level.  A conservative review can be 
established for contracts of $100,000 and above, moderate for contracts between 
$300,000 and $500,000 and an aggressive review for contracts above $500,000.  Based 
on experience, warranted CCO with less than one year should be capped at a threshold of 
$25,000, for those with one to two years of experience $100,000 to $500,000, and finally 
those with more than three years should be set above $500,000.  Executing contracts 
without the appropriate level of warrant, or making cash purchases without proper 
oversight pose the risk of improper controls in the absence of C2 (SOUTHCOM, 2010).   
Phase Zero incorporation and credentialing of CCO into OPLAN as detailed in 
Yoder Three-Tier Model (YTTM), identifies the appropriate level of contracting 
experience and task assignment requisite of contracting personnel involved in 
contingency operations (Yoder, 2004).  When properly implemented, the YTTM and 
SFM will ensure DoD contracting and logistics responders can effectively communicate 
and coordinate their efforts during contingency operations such as OUR.   
2. Lack of Coordination of Efforts (COE) 
Coordination of effort is an important element of effective disaster relief effort.  
This was a huge challenge in Haiti.  Relief efforts between USAID, OUR components, 
civilian volunteers, and other foreign nations were uncoordinated during the first 100 
hours.  Several entities poured supplies into Haiti while others went there to provide 
services without proper coordination, and a majority of them did not know with whom to 
coordinate their efforts once they arrived on the scene.   A large number of relief 
organizations including USAID initially had unclear guidance on which organization(s) 
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they were supporting making it difficult for them to properly coordinate their efforts.  For 
instance, the initial support USAID requested from the JTF-H was not immediately met 
since the JTF was unsure about the level of support it could provide outside of its 
assigned tasks (Clifton, 2010).    
Due to the lack of coordination and unclear tasking, several military units were 
either stuck on tasks that were not required or discharged from their assigned task prior to 
tasks completion (Clifton, 2010).  Most tasks and responsibilities were not preassigned, 
rather, task were assigned during the disaster operation as the need arose, and the 
different units performed tasks they deemed important until they were assigned specific 
tasks.  Additionally, the tasks were the aligned with the operational goal (Clifton, 2010).  
Consequently, supplies were delivered by trucks, air, sea and some were even 
dropped from the sky via helicopters but most of these supplies were not getting to the 
victims due to the lack of coordination.  According to CNN World report, a relief worker, 
Alain Joyandet, the French minister in charge of humanitarian aid, complained that U.S. 
military build-up was hindering relief efforts.  Another relief worker complained that aid 
was not reaching many of the 2 million Haitians who needed aid, because those who are 
supposed to be coordinating the efforts are inept. “It’s terrible," said Eric Klein, head of 
disaster-relief agency CAN-DO, "there's got to be coordination” (CNN World, 2010)."   
3. Misalignment of Tasks With Operational Goals 
USAID immediate goal in Haiti during OUR was to save lives and …"the goal of 
the relief effort in the first 72 hours will be focused on saving lives…and USAID would 
endeavor to coordinate all efforts across the federal government (Rajiv Shay, USAID 
Administrator).  Shay emphasized that USAID would utilize all U.S. assets and capacities 
in order to promptly and effectively provide assistance to the disaster victims 
(GlobalSecurityOrg, 2010).”  In Haiti, U.S. logistics and contracting efforts were 
uncoordinated, resulting in several misaligned tasks, which made the operational goal 
difficult to attain during the first 100 hours (Clifton, 2010). 
Attempts to provide aid when not properly aligned with operational goals could 
result in confusion, delays, duplication of efforts, and unnecessary wastage of funds.  
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Thus, each response units must be conversant with the overall big picture to better 
understand the situation in order to properly align tasks and responsibilities with 
operational goals.  To this end, a U.S. Army component purchased several 5K tankers for 
fueling operations, whereas the response operation required smaller vehicles due to the 
rough terrain and the pile of debris that made a majority of Haiti’s roads difficult to 
navigate—especially with large vehicles and heavy tankers.  Such misalignment of tasks 
and uncoordinated efforts pinpoint lack of communications, improper delineation of tasks 
by the C2 component and situational unawareness (Clifton, 2010).   
4. Inadequate Situational Awareness  
Federal law, Section 515 of the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C. § 
321d(b)(1)),requires the National Operation Center (NOC) to provide 
situational awareness and a common operating picture for the entire 
federal Government, and for state, local, and tribal governments as 
appropriate, and to ensure that responders and decision makers receive 
critical disaster-related information—in this case, to provide situational 
awareness directly related to the response, recovery, and rebuilding effort 
in Haiti. (DHS, 2010). 
The law defines situational awareness as “information gathered from a variety of 
sources that, when communicated to emergency managers and decision makers, can form 
the basis for incident management decision making (DHS, 2010).” Therefore, situational 
awareness paints a common operating picture for responders to ensure that critical 
disaster-related information is properly disseminated.   In Haiti, situational awareness 
was disseminated to military planners through aerial images of Haiti—taken by the U.S. 
Air Force Global Hawk—to facilitate the coordination U.S. military support 
(SOUTHCOM, 2010).  However, the earliest of these images posted on SOUTHCOM 
website was dated 14 January 2010, which corresponds to the date the Deployable Joint 
Command and Control (DJC2) arrived in Haiti.  Since a fully functional C2 was not 
established until 10 days after the disaster (SOUTHCOM, 2010), DoD components did 
not have clear guidance to properly utilize the situational awareness provision at their 
disposal and this adversely affected alignment of their respective goals to the JTF’s 
operational goals. 
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One indication of the lack of situational awareness in Haiti, was that the USNS 
Mercy was taken off dry-dock to assist in the relief effort only to be greeted by patients 
with chronic issues that were not caused by the earthquake.  Proper situational assessment 
facilitated by clear communications, coordination and control would have prevented this 
unnecessary mission, prevented the waste of funds and shift in Mercy’s operational cycle.    
Another situational awareness issue was that the Haitians did not like the Meals 
Ready Eat (MRE) and were discarding them, but that was what DoD supplied—in huge 
and excessive amounts.   There was also an overabundance of bottled water supplied to 
Haiti, to the extent that people washed cars with bottled water (Clifton, 2010).  The initial 
supply of MREs and water was a humanitarian gesture; however, continued supply when 
it was apparent that the victims were unreceptive to the meals and wasting the water 
delineates situational unawareness caused by the lack of control element and inadequate 
Phase Zero planning.   
C. PHASE ZERO PLANNING 
Preparation for an effective response should begin at Phase Zero of an HA/DR 
operation as this analysis reveals.  Phase Zero planning sets the stage for proper response 
during contingencies since it is the phase where responses to contingencies are shaped 
(Yoder, 2010).  Such proactive preparatory measures improve response coordination, 
communication, and command and control, which were deficient during the first 100 
hours of OUR.  The command and control challenges experienced in Haiti could have 
been addressed provided there was adequate preplanning prior to the occurrence of the 
disaster.  Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response (HA/DR) operations, irrespective 
of location, magnitude and extent of devastation, are essentially driven by logistics and 
the ability to deliver on time supplies to victims of disasters is crucial to their survival 
(Clifton, 2010).    
Timely responses are often challenged by factors like the chaos created by the 
earthquake, clusters from relief personnel and relief items pushed to Haiti, and lack of 
coordination of efforts. These factors usually makes response and relief goals difficult to 
attain (Clifton, 2010).   Effective Phase Zero planning utilizing lessons from past 
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disasters would enable DoD to identify requirements early, preposition supplies, identify 
and train disaster response personnel as prescribed by the Stella’s Future Model, to 
facilitate prompt and effective disaster responses.  Thus, incorporation of YTTM (Yoder, 
2004) and SFM will aid SOUTHCOM in identifying, credentialing, and integrating 
contracting and logistics personnel into its contingency planning phase. 
D. STELLA’S FUTURE CONTRACTING/LOGISTICS MODEL (SFCLM) 
The SFCLM abbreviated as Stella’s Future Model (SFM) is based on the premise 
of the Joint Effects-Based Contracting (JEBC) (Poree et al, 2008) and Yoder’s Phase 
Zero (Phase Zero) concepts (Yoder, 2010).  The SFM creates a parallel hierarchy in 
logistics similar to the Yoder Three Tier Model (YTTM) for contingency contracting 
officers (CCO) by designing an integrated logistics training and credentialing pipeline.  
Additionally, the SFM creates a DR contracting pipeline, know as Disaster Response 
Joint Contracting Officer (DRJCO), which is derived from the YTTM but tailored 
specifically for DR.  In SFM, DR contracting incorporates contracting with logistics.  The 
DRJCO will be credentialed at YTTM Tier levels (Tiers I to III), and will also be 
certified at DR I through III so that they have enough background in DR logistics to 
provide adequate support to logisticians in the field.  The SFM takes a forward look at 
“Future” logistics and contracting requirements to determine the type and level of 
contracting and logistics support DoD requires in planning for and responding to future 
disasters.   
The JEBC concept integrates contingency contracting officers (CCO) into the 
warfighter’s operational planning cycle to align tactical contracting efforts with the 
warfighter’s effort (Poree et al, 2008); therefore, in tailoring the SFM for DR, the 
researchers determined that the JEBC concept will be most beneficial if Disaster 
Response Joint Contracting Officers (DRJCO), led by Yoder’s Integrated Planner and 
Executor (IPE) (Yoder, 2004) and Disaster Response Joint Logisticians (DRJL), led by 
the Integrated Logistics Executor (ILE), are integrated into the planning phase of disaster 
response (DR).  Integration of the DRJCO and DRL in addition to other support and field 
level contracting officers and logisticians prescribed by the SFM, DoD will enable DoD 
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to determine future requirements and customize the CCO and logistician’s efforts 
towards specified and predefined response structures.   
1. Disaster Response Joint Logistics (DRJL) Pipelines 
Disaster Response Joint Logistics will be a specialized field of study for 
logisticians.  A senior military or DoD civilian logisticians, the ILE, will be the lead 
logistician.  The DR Identifier (DRI), DR Requisitioner (DRR), and Logistics Task 
Teams (LTT) will assist the ILE in identifying Phase Zero logistics requirements and 
developing plans to enhance prompt and effective disaster responses.  The DRCCO 
pipeline mirrors the YTTM, modified for disaster response operations, as discussed under 
DRJCCO Pipeline.  Figure 5 shows the structure for integrating DRJL and DRJCO at 
appropriate levels of the disaster response life cycle.  Personnel above the bottom black 
line represent those involved in Phase Zero planning, while personnel beneath the bottom 
black line are the on-scene responder in Phase One, of DR life cycle. 
 
Figure 2.   Organizational Chart for Disaster Response Logistics and Contracting 
a. Disaster Response Joint Logistics Functions and Certification 
Table 1 gives a snapshot of the functions of DRJL personnel, while Table 





Functional requirements and certification level of DRJL 




Logistics Task Teams 
(LTT) 
¾ Deployable teams 
¾ Provides and coordinate on-scene 
logistics support  
¾ Provide 1st hand logistics 
requirements to ILE/DRR/DRI 
¾ Logistics point of contact in a 








DR Identifier (DRI)/ 
Requisitioner (DRR) 
¾ Identify DR logistics requirements 
¾ Provide LCE with up to date 
logistics requirements list 
¾ Determine prepositioning logistics 
requirements 
¾ Ensure integration of all logistics 
support elements 
¾ Train the LTT and other DR 













¾ Lead logistician  
¾ Actively involved in Phase Zero 
and beyond 
¾ Plan and develop tactic and 
operational DR logistics support  
¾ Strategize theater logistics support 
for each regional segment 
¾ Align DR logistics to DR objectives 
¾ Ensure logistics sustainability and 
readiness 
¾ Communicate logistics goals, 







DRL Level III 







Disaster Response Logistics Certification Requirements 
 
Disaster Response Logistician 
Level I 
Disaster Response 
Logistician Level II 
Disaster Response 
Logistician Level III 
 
¾ Certified DAWIA 
Level I or II Lifecycle 
or Acquisition Logistics 
Certifications 
¾ Possess a minimum of 
4 years experience in 
Logistics, Acquisition, 
Finance or other related 
fields.  
¾ Possess a Bachelors 




Chain Management or 
related programs.  
¾ Must be a 0-3 or above 
from any of the services 
or the DoD civilian 
equivalent. 
¾ Joint Professional 
Military Education 
(JPME) Level I.* 
 
¾ Certified DAWIA 
Level II Lifecycle or 
Acquisition Logistics 
Certifications 
¾ Possess a minimum of 
6 years experience in 
Logistics, Acquisition, 
Finance or other related 
fields.  
¾ Possess a Bachelors or 




Chain Management or 
related programs.  
¾ Must be a 0-4 or above 
from any of the services 
or the DoD civilian 
equivalent. 
¾ Joint Professional 
Military Education 
(JPME) Level I. * 
 
¾ Certified DAWIA Level III 
Lifecycle and Acquisition 
Logistics Certifications 
¾ Possess a minimum of 10 
years experience in 
Logistics, Acquisition, 
Finance or other related 
fields.  
¾ Possess a Masters or 




Chain Management or 
related programs.  
¾ Must be a 0-6 or above 
from any of the services or 
the DoD civilian 
equivalent. 
¾ Joint Professional Military 
Education (JPME) Level 
II, such as Industrial 
College of the Armed 
Forces (ICAF) * 
Table 2.   Disaster Response Logistics Certification Requirements 
In addition to the above DRL requirements, Levels I through III DR Logisticians must undergo DR 
training.  Training can be developed by COCOMs, DAU or individual units providing DR support 
personnel.  However, training must be standardized and should be tailored as a one-size-fit-all so 
that all DR personnel, regardless of branch of service undergo the same type of training.  This will 
ensure that all response efforts are standardized.   
*   JPME is required for all military personnel filling the above positions. 
 
b. ILE Certified Logistician 
The lead logistician will bear the title Integrated Logistics Executor, 
certified at DRL Level III.  The ILE will be integrated into the joint operations planning 
for DR to align joint logistics requirements and logistics deployments support with the 
COCOMs and DR Joint Task Force (JTF) objectives during Phase Zero and Phase One, 
respectively.  The ILE will plan and develop effective tactical and operational logistics 
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support strategies, align logistics strategies with DR objectives, ensure there is adequate 
support and sustainability of DR logistics requirements and operational readiness, ensure 
all logistics personnel are trained in DR and there are enough personnel for deployment 
during crisis.  The ILE will be actively involved in the planning phase of COCOM’s DR 
operational plan and throughout the DR logistics life cycle, communicate logistics 
objectives, metrics, and deficiencies, to the COCOM.   
c. DR Requirements Identifiers (DRI)/ Requisitioners (DRR) 
DRI and DRR may be the same or different personnel.  All DRI/ DRR will 
at a minimum, be certified at DR Level II.  The DRI will identify requirements in Phase 
Zero that will be needed for disaster responses and the DRR will work with the Logistics 
Contracts Executor (LCE) to requisition and award contracts for those requirements.  
They will assist the ILE in Planning/development of effective logistics support prior to 
the occurrence of disasters and ensure adequate logistics support and services are 
available in all COCOM’s regional segment.  Additionally, they will ensure proper 
integration of all support elements to maximize logistics support and readiness; utilize 
lessons learned from previous disasters to identify and determine common DR logistics 
requirements and ensure that the LCE has up to date lists of all DR requirements; train 
the LTT and other services logistics personnel as required. The DRI/R requirement 
determination function is expanded below. 
(1)  Requirements Identification.  Requirements determined 
necessary for DR will be requisitioned upon approval by the proper command and 
decision chain.  Requirements that do not have to be prepositioned will be forwarded to 
the DRJCO to be placed on the Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) or 
Multiple Award Contracts (MAC) as prescribed by Yoder (Yoder, 2004) and executed 
when crisis occurs.   DR requirements will be determined and identified based on, but not 
limited to, the following factors. 
• Geographic Location 
• Mode of Accessibility/Transportation Requirements 
• Climate, Seasons and Environmental Conditions 
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• Culture 
• Demographics and Population Size 
• Political Views 
• Religious Views 
• Relationship With the U.S. 
• Needs of U.S. Relief Providers 
• U.S. Citizens Resident in That Location 
 
(2)  Prepositioning.  All approved requirements for prepositioning 
will be forwarded to the CCO for synopsis and contracts award.  Factors like costs, 
availability/suitability in the regional segment, expiration dates, etc. should be considered 
before selecting items for prepositioning. Items like generators, long-life batteries, water 
purifiers, reverse-osmosis equipments, water bladders, blankets, debris clearing 
equipments, and other logistics support items with long expiration or no expiration dates 
may be considered for prepositioning. 
d. Logistics Task Teams (LTT) 
These are logisticians certified at Level II or Level I and may or may not 
be subordinate to the DRI and/or DRR.  The LTT will be trained for on-scene disaster 
response and will be the lead logisticians during crisis response in the absence of the DRI 
or DRR.  The LTT will be the first logistics line of defense and will communicate 
directly with the DRR, DRI and/or LCE.   LTT personnel will be assigned to specific 
teams and will respond to disasters on a roster basis.  Each LTT will know months in 
advance of a disaster what timeframe they will be required to respond to disasters as they 
will be on call for disaster response.  This will enable the LTT to plan accordingly.  
Depending on the nature and extent of the disaster, more than one LTT may be required 
to respond to a disaster. Like the DRI/ DRR, the LTT will be able to plan and develop 
effective DR and sustainability strategies, develop effective on-scene logistics 
procurement and supportability measures consistent with the JTF goals, execute and 
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manage on-scene DR logistics, communicate DR logistics need to the DRI/DRR and 
coordinate all DR logistics support directly with the JTF/JTF staff during DR operations. 
2. Disaster Response “Joint” Contracting Support (DRJCS) Pipeline 
DRJCS is a construct based on the JEBC and YTTM, designed to integrate 
contracting personnel into the early phases of disaster response planning, it also aligns 
DR contracting support with DR operational goals.  DRJCS creates the disaster response 
contingency contracting officer equivalent of the YTTM and assigns specific 
responsibilities to DR contracting personnel during the different phases of DR life cycle.  
DRJCS will have a preassigned staff dedicated to disaster response efforts in order to 
enhance the COCOM/JTF objectives.  The lead CCO within the DRJCS will be the 
Integrated Planning Executor (IPE).        
Table 3 outlines the functions of the DRJCO at the different levels of certification.  
Table 4 is the YTTM that delineates the education, skills set and credential requisite of 




Functional Requirements & Certification Levels for DRJCO 





Field CCO (FCCO) 
¾ On scene-first (contracting) responder 
¾ Deploys with the LTT 
¾ Lead CCO on ground 
¾ Coordinate all DR contracting efforts 
during DR operations 
¾ Conduct oral solicitations if necessary 
and execute contract awards 
¾ Liaise with vendors/contractors and 
JTF component 
















(LCE) and CCO 
¾ Assist IPE with Planning/development 
of DR contracting support 
¾ Conduct Market Research 
¾ Pre-award contracts  
¾ Maintain contracting procedures and 
integrity 
¾ Integrate lessons learned in identifying 
proper contracting procedures 
¾ Support DRI/DRI logistics effort 














Integrated Planner &  
Executor (ILE) 
¾ Plan, develop and strategize Theater 
contracting support 
¾ Lead CCO 
¾  Actively involved in Phase Zero and 
beyond 
¾ Align DR contracting goals with 
COCOM’s DR objectives 
¾ Develop tactical DR contracting 
support  for DR logistics requirements 
¾ Communicate DR contracting 
objectives, metrics, waiver 
requirements to COCOM 
¾ Ensure availability and readiness of 




Yoder Tier III: 
Integrated Planner & 
Executor (IPE) 
 
DR II or III 





Model Tier Level & Model Title  Functions/Education/Rank  Highlights and Drawbacks  
Ordering Officer—Tier One  
 
• basic ordering  
• some simplified acquisitions  
• training: DAU CON 234  
• DAWIA Certified CON Level I or 
II  
• junior to mid-enlisted, junior 




• simple buys  
• little integration  
• no operational planning  
• no broad liaison functions  
 
Leveraging Contracting 
Officer—Tier Two  
 
• leverages to local economy  
• reduces “pushed” material support  
• training/education:  
• DAU CON 234, recommended 
higher education  
• DAWIA Certified CON Level II 
or III  
• senior enlisted, junior to mid-




• better local operational planning 
• some integration  
• more capability for the 
operational commander  
• no planned theater integration  
• no broad liaison functions  
• may perform to optimize local 
operations at the detriment to 
theater ops  
 
Integrated Planner and 
Executor (IPE)—Tier Three  
 
• highest level of planning and 
integration—joint  
• linked/integrated with J-4 and J-5  
• creates and executes OPLAN 
CCO strategy  
• provides direction to tier two and 
one  
• links operations strategically to 
theater objectives of COCOM  
• education: Master’s degree or 
higher and, JPME Phase I and II  
• DAWIA Certified CON Level III, 
and other DAWIA disciplines 
(LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc.)  
• senior officers (0-6+), senior 
civilians, GS-13+ or SES  
 
 
• performs operational and theater 
analysis, integrates results into 
OPLAN  
• link between COCOM and 
OPLAN to all theater contracting 
operations  
• coordinates theater objectives 
with best approach to contracted 
support  
• can achieve broader national 
security goals through effective 
distribution of national assets  
• includes planning, 
communication, coordination, 
and exercising with NGO and 
PVO in theater  
 
Table 4.   YTTM for Contingency Contracting Operations (Yoder, 2004, p. 17) 
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a. Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) 
The IPE holds the highest credentials at YTTM Tier-Three level and is 
able to perform at the highest level of integration, planning and execution (Yoder, 2004).  
When integrated into the DR planning phase, the IPE will align the DR contracting 
efforts with the COCOM’s DR goals through proper planning, coordination and 
execution of contingency contracting prior to, and during disasters. The IPE will develop 
effective tactical and operational contacting support strategies, ensure prompt contracting 
support for DR logistics requirements and other operational contracting support, ensure 
all contracting personnel are trained and certified at the appropriate level, ensure CCOs 
are assigned to the different DR task teams and are available for deployment during 
crisis.  The IPE will be actively involved in the COCOM’s DR operational planning and 
effectively communicate contracting objectives, metrics, and waiver requirements (if 
any), to the COCOM.   
b. Logistics Contract Executor and (LCE)/CCO  
The LCE will be certified at YTM Tier-Two level and will assist the IPE 
in meeting joint DR contracting goals during Phase Zero and beyond.  The LCE will plan 
and develop effective contracting support and pre-awarded contract requirements prior to 
the occurrence of disasters.  The LCE and CCO will conduct adequate market research 
within the U.S. and in the COCOMs regional segment to identify vendors that can meet 
the DR logistics requirements.  The LCE/CCO ensures adequate competition by 
synopsizing the DR requirements to solicit bids/ proposals from prospective vendors and 
offerors.  Once qualified vendors are selected, the LCE will ensure all proper contracting 
procedures and policies are followed in awarding the DR logistics support contracts.  The 
LCE/CCO will ensure all contracting support elements are in place to maximize DR 
contracting support and operational readiness.  The LCE/CCO will integrate lessons from 
previous disasters with the FAR and agency procedures in identifying the proper contract 
type(s) to meet the DR logistics requirements.  The LCE/CCO will train the FCCO and 
other services contracting personnel as necessary.   
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c. Field CCO (FCCO) 
The FCCO will be certified at the YTM Tier-One level and assigned by 
the LCE to the different LTT.  FCCOs will be trained on on-scene contingency 
contracting/DR support and will be the lead CCO on ground during DR in the absence of 
the LCE.  They will assist the LTT in meeting contracting requirements beyond pre-
awarded contracts.  The FCCO may conduct oral solicitations and contract awards, 
including cash purchases during disaster response.   FCCO will liaise directly with the 
LCE, vendors/contractors, and will administer DR contracts.  The FCCO will also be the 
‘go-to” contracting personnel within the JTF.  FCCO will also assist the LCE in planning 
and developing contract support strategies as well as soliciting and pre-awarding DR 
contracts.  
3. Additional Steps Required for Effective SFM Implementation 
Phase Zero implementation of the SFM requires that the following steps be taken 
in order to effectively develop and incorporate SFM into DR operational life cycle. 
a. Alliances and Partnerships 
The COCOM will forge allegiances with USAID and other key players 
and partner with foreign military and organizations involved in the business of to 
facilitate effective communication, command and control, and to effectively coordinate 
and standardize DR processes. 
b. Regional Segmentation 
DoD/COCOM will segment its AOR such that two different countries are 
designated as staging/operational locations for DR operations.  The two countries may 
not share common boundaries to mitigate the possibility of both regional segments been 
affected by the same disaster.   The need to study and understand different regions, the 
types of disasters common to each area and plan ahead for humanitarian and disaster 




may create unnecessary challenges that could defeat all common sense logistics 
management processes, such as the push, rather than pull system, which occurred in Haiti 
during OUR (Clifton, 2010).   
c. Funding 
Financial managers and planners must identify the line(s) of accounting 
for the COCOMs mission based on the AOR and ensure that funds are available for 
contract awards and meeting DR logistics requirements. 
d. Personnel Identification and Task Assignments 
Personnel must be identified, trained and credentialed as prescribed by 
SFM and YTTM (Yoder, 2004).  Also disaster response duties and tasks must be 
assigned prior to disasters.  Selected DR personnel need not be attached to COCOMs, but 
they must be trained and ready for immediate activation during disasters.  All military 
units must predesignate and train disaster response personnel.  These personnel will 
either be assigned to the COCOM during disasters or act as liaisons/command 
representatives if the specific unit is tasked for disaster response duties.  All key 
personnel like the IPE and ILE must be full time staffs of the COCOM.  
e. Requirement Determination 
Determine logistics and contracting requirements prior to disaster.  Pre-
award contracts (IDIQ, MAC, etc.,), preposition requirements, and have a standardize 
list/ flow diagram of the different types of logistics support required at the various stages 
of the response operation and identify who, where and how the requirements will be met.  
Factor in global and Private Volunteer Organization (PVO) support when defining 
requirements.  CCO must conduct market research to seek global and local vendors and 
perform proper contracting guidelines in awarding contracts. 
       *** Limit prepositioning considering shortfalls and things like expiration dates. 
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f. Barriers and Restrictions 
Determine issues like cultural, religious, gender, and traditional barriers 
when determining requirements and assigning personnel.  For instance the Tsunami 
response required female personnel to present relief to the Muslim women affected by the 
disaster. 
4. Assumptions in Developing the SFM 
In designing the SFM, the researchers assumed the following: 
• The YTTM is under-utilized YTTM but if combined with the SFM 
and effectively incorporated into the DR life cycle, specifically in 
Phase Zero planning, the combination will streamline and enhance 
DoD response effectiveness. 
• DoD will adopt the SFM in association with the YTTM to create a 
specialized field in contracting and logistics (i.e. the DRJCO and 
DRJL pipelines) specifically tailored to DR operations.  The 
required contracting and logistics response may be similar in all 
disaster response efforts, but the deployment of these support 
services is different.  Therefore, DoD may not respond in similar 
manners to every disaster.  A contingency such as the Iraqi war for 
instance, pose a different challenges than contingencies 
encountered during disasters and other crisis situations.  The SFM 
and YTTM provide the foundation for separately integrating 
contingency contracting and logistics requirements to different 
contingencies. 
• All military units will provide personnel for training and 
preparation for disaster response.  Such personnel will be 
immediately available for deployment in support of DR operations. 
• COCOMs and DoD will be committed to implementation and 
execution of the SFM. 
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5. Limitations to the SFM Implementation 
Implementation of the SFM may be limited by the following: 
• DoD may not have enough personnel for DR assignments. 
• Creating a separate disaster response contracting and logistics 
pipeline may be cumbersome and may require modifications to 
present logistics and contracting models 
• Defense Acquisition University (DAU) may not be properly 
staffed to provide training leading to DR certifications 
• Funding may not be available to implement the SFM 
• Personnel and commands may choose to maintain status quo than 
adopt a change—even when such a change offers long-term 
benefits 
6. Implications and Recommendations for SFM Implementation 
If implemented properly, the SFM will reduce disaster response challenges such 
as: Command and control, unity/coordination of effort, and communication. The 
researchers determined that cost and manpower constraints may adversely affect the 
effective implementation of SFM.  Therefore, they recommend that personnel be selected 
and trained within their various units.  Upon request from the COCOMs, these personnel 
will be temporarily assigned to the COCOM to conduct DR operations.  Each branch of 
service will be given a quota and units within each service will be assigned 
predetermined personnel requirement.  Units on deployment away from the homeport 
will not be tasked with personnel requirements.  Personnel returning from extended 
deployments or in the process of deploying may be exempted from DR duties.  Top level 
logisticians and contracting officers must be permanently assigned to the COCOM.   
Funding and line of accounting will be predetermined and the COCOM should 
have given a sizeable pot of money to fund DR.  This will create proper control of the DR 
effort and spending and will prevent wasteful spending, which may result from 
duplication of efforts. Also, it will ensure that there is funding available and how much of 
the funds can be used for DR.  DAU may develop the DR course with support from 
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COCOM and DoD components and these training may be offered and proctored by 
COCOM or command personnel other than DAU staff.  The course may also be offered 
online to reduce DAU staffing requirements and personnel absentee from their respective 
units.  DR training and SFM implementation should be mandatory for personnel 
designated commands tasked with DR personnel requirements.  This will preclude 
commands from adopting the “status quo.”  
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the researchers determined that DoD was not as effective as it 
could be in responding to disasters.  Issues like situational unawareness, which was 
directly linked to delayed establishment of command and control and the cascading 
impact on communication between DoD response personnel and other key players, 
coordination of effort and misaligned responsibilities, were responsible for DoD’s sub-
optimized response effectiveness.  The analysis revealed that DoD may not be matured 
enough as a joint force in incorporating personnel from different branch of services who 
do not speak the same operational language, therefore they recommended that DoD 
implement the Stella’s Future Model (SFM) in combination with the YTTM (Yoder, 
2004) to streamline and standardize DoD DR operations.  
The researchers made some assumptions and pinpointed limitations to effective 
implementation of the SFM.  In addressing possible implications, the researchers 
suggested that to decrease the impact of cost and manpower constraints, which could 
adversely affect the implementation of the  SFM, units providing disaster response 
personnel should do so only during actual disasters but such personnel most be 
indentified and trained prior to the disaster.  Proper implementation of the SFM will 
reduce common issues that plague DoD disaster response operations.  Issues like C2, 
Communication and Coordination of efforts will be reduced or eliminated and DoD’s 
disaster response operations will become more effective. 
The next chapter concludes this research analysis and provide recommendations 
to improve DoD DR effectiveness.  Additionally, it suggests critical areas for further 
research to promote DoD effectiveness and implementation of the SFM. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
This chapter summarizes the four preceding chapters and concludes the research 
analysis by answering the primary and secondary questions on which the research 
analysis was conducted.  Based on the findings from the conduct of this analysis, the 
researchers provide recommendations on how DoD can respond more effectively to 
disasters.  Finally, the researchers suggested areas for further studies to afford DoD more 
tools to streamline its response processes and ultimately become more effective by 
getting the right supplies and services, in the right amount, at the right cost, and at the 
right time to disaster victims.   
With limited quantitative data available for the period observed in this research, 
establishing a context of past HA/DR operations, and joint military operations and 
planning, contributed to the team formulating a qualitative analysis of logistics and 
contracting effectiveness in the first 100 hours of OUR.  In developing the basis in which 
to impartially evaluate the actions of a disaster response operation, such that the 
effectiveness of the logistics and contracting efforts accomplished in the first 100 hours 
of OUR may be determined, this team structured its research around the primary 
disciplines of the thesis question.  The analysis revealed similarities between the 
objectives and challenges of OUR and past disaster operations.  As such, the 
effectiveness of the initial logistics and contracting support for each operation was 
dismal.  These findings led this research team to the corresponding conclusions and 
recommendations for the logistics and contracting support conducted in the initial 100 
hours of OUR.  
A. SUMMARY 
The U.S./DoD has been in the business of disaster response for many decades.  
However, its response efforts to disasters, domestic or foreign, often fall short of its 
effectiveness yardstick.  The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, the 2005 U.S. Gulf Coasts 
Hurricane Katrina and more recently, the 2010 Haiti earthquake disasters are testaments 
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of DoD’s less than effective disaster response efforts.  In the recent National Security 
Strategy (NSS), President Obama, emphasized the expanding range of military operations 
(ROMO) to include humanitarian aid and disaster response and operations and the 
growing need for DoD to respond to crisis situations.  Against this backdrop, the 
researchers developed a research analysis and research questions in Chapter I, to access 
DoD’s effectiveness in the Haiti disaster response effort, to determine where if and where 
it fell short in meeting disaster response objectives and to provide recommendations on 
how it can better improve its disaster response operations. 
Chapter II, reviewed some historical and present literature on disasters and U.S./ 
DoD responses to those disasters to determine if there are any trends and/or progress in 
the way DoD respond to disasters.  In reviewing past history on DoD disaster response 
operations, the researchers noted that a trend in ineffective response operations indicative 
of deficiencies in command and control establishments.  
Chapter III, conducted a research analysis tailored around the researcher questions 
on DoD’s effectiveness in its recent response operation to the January 2010, Haiti 
earthquake disaster; it answered the research interview questions and analyzed those 
answers using the response from participant in the research analysis.   They also 
identified challenges DoD responders encountered during OUR and that lack of 
standardize means of performance measurement obscure the effectiveness of 
performance measurements.   
Chapter IV, determined from the research analysis findings that DoD there was 
shortcomings in DR effectiveness during its recent Operation Unified Response (OUR).  
Consistent with the trends identified from past disaster response reviewed, the researchers 
determined that a deficiency in C2 had a cascading negative impact on DoD response 
effectiveness during the first 100 hours of OUR.  This alluded that DoD has not 
successfully incorporated lessons from previous disasters into its present-day response 
processes; the team found that although some progress had been made, U.S./DoD still 
have ample room for improvement in its disaster response efforts.    
 73
B. CONCLUSION  
As a world leader and frequent responder to disasters and crisis situations, the 
U.S. and DoD must strive to improve its disaster response effectiveness.  Disasters are 
becoming more frequent and more destructive as the world becomes more curious and 
evolves into greater technological realms that may create environmental catastrophes 
such as global warming and nuclear incidents.  Also, earthquake may happen in 
California in a magnitude never before seen in history or it may happen as far away as 
“Never Land.”  Regardless of where disasters occur, the U.S. must be prepared to take 
the lead in meeting the uncertainties and challenges they present.  It must also be willing 
to work with foreign nations and response organizations so that the brunt of disaster 
challenges does not fall squarely on U.S. shoulders.   
The military must be robust and resilient in order to deal with the uncertainties of 
combat, which he referred to as the “fog of war.”  This resilience also applies to disasters 
situations as well.  Thus, revealing the structures that provide such robustness is useful to 
all organizations (Weeks, 2010).  Therefore, in order to shed some light into the 
structures into DoD’s disaster response structure and effectiveness, the researchers re-
examined the questions they developed in conducting this research analysis, specifically, 
questions on what DoD did right and what it did not do so well during the first 100 hours 
of the operation. 
Conclusion 1: 
U.S./DoD has not fully mastered the skills of disaster response and as such, its 
response effectiveness leaves ample room for improvement. 
The research analysis conducted in Chapter III led to the determination in Chapter 
IV that that DoD contracting and logistics support to Haiti during the first 100 hours of 
the disaster was not very effective.   A delay in establishing a functioning command and 
control (C2) and the consequential impact on communications, coordination of efforts, 
created insufficient situational awareness and misalignment of goals, which made 
attaining DoD response objective difficult.    
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Conclusion 2: 
SOUTHCOM, which led DoD efforts, did not sufficiently plan or create an 
organization structure expansive enough to handle disasters of extensive 
magnitudes. 
The research analysis revealed several shortcomings in SOUTHCOM’s support to 
the disaster relief efforts in Haiti.  Weaknesses in SOUTHCOM organizational structure 
adversely impacted its efforts to conduct a disaster response of such magnitude as the 
Haiti earthquake.  Additionally, its logistics function was sub-optimized causing delays in 
providing on-time supply services to the disaster victims. Proper Phase Zero planning 
would alleviate some of the response challenges and create the awareness that 
SOUTHCOM needs to extend its organizational structure to accommodate critical 
contracting and logistics capabilities. 
Conclusion 3:  
SFM and YTTM provide the basis for DoD to better align its logistics and 
contracting goals to DR objectives to enable a n effective response mechanisms.  
Without the right composite of people, products, and processes it is impossible to 
effectively integrate contracting and logistics capabilities to improve the response effort.  
Therefore, incorporating the S  FM into the DR life cycle create a responsive contracting 
and logistics capabilities for effect deployment and support of DR operations.  
Conclusion 4:  
Some aspects of OUR went right while other aspects went wrong resulting in lessons 
that can be used in planning for future disasters 
1. What Went Right 
Thus far, this research has identified some significant issues in the response phase 
of OUR, so determining what went right in the first 100 hours posed a challenge for this 
team.  However, the researchers determined that the following went right during OUR: 
• Considering the period of time examined in this research, quite possibly 
the most essential part of the operation was handled swiftly and without 
hesitation and that was DoD’s initial reaction to a nation in distress.  
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SOUTHCOM tasked its service components upon initiating OUR, and 
sent subsequent FRAGOs within the first 100 hours of the operation.  
Inside of 48 hours of receiving task orders, the Coast Guard and Navy had 
ships off the coast of Port Au Prince providing aid to those in Haiti and 
SOUTHCOM had responders in country making strives to coordinate the 
effort.   
• The essentials to basic life support were provided almost immediately, 
such as tarpaulin for shelter, water, food and security.  The U.S. Military 
played a major role in providing security at the ports of entry and along 
logistics routes, which was critical as OUR progressed into the succeeding 
phases of the operation.  Units on the ground in Haiti cleared damaged 
airstrips and constructed temporary piers in spite of the adverse conditions 
in which they had to endure.  DoD responders provided medical attention 
to those who needed it, and victims in need of more urgent care were 
transported to better equipped facilities. 
• Contracting personnel on the ground followed FAR procedures to the 
maximum extent practicable to ensure prompt support to responders.  
Employing commercial procurement methods in awarding firm fixed-
priced contracts as they strived to streamline the contract award process 
through verbal, sometimes non-competitive bid/solicitation when 
possible—with contract awards going to the most qualified provider as the 
circumstances permitted; also in streamlining the procurement processes, 
purchases were made using cash transactions.  Contracting personnel also 
initiated spot buys with local venders and neighboring nations to purchase 
fuel for aircraft, heavy machinery, vehicles and support equipment. 
• Amidst the chaos and unrest the disaster stricken nation of Haiti, the 
planners and coordinators of OUR managed to pool their resources in 
support of DoD and USAID first responders, who were then able to 
provide some timely relief to a nation in distress. Overall, what went right 
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is that the job got done—victims were fed, clothed, treated and 
sheltered—but how effectively the was job done is another question that is 
addressed below. 
2. What Went Wrong 
With the success story told in the previous paragraph, one would assume that 
DoD response operation went completely right.  However, several events in the first 100 
hours of OUR could have been performed better:   
• Many logistics and disaster response personnel did not have adequate  
• training on disaster response and most of their efforts were disorganized 
and inefficient.  According to Hanley, the U.N. humanitarian coordinator 
John Holmes commented that “there are limits to being 100 percent 
prepared… this is a major test for all of us and we cannot afford to fail… 
(2010).”  In Haiti, OUR was a major test of U.S./ DoD’s efficiency in 
disaster response operation and in spite of its efforts, DoD could not attain 
100 percent performance level.   
• Many of the logistics and contracting inefficiencies that hindered DoD’s 
overall effectiveness were due to improper preparation and planning 
during Phase Zero and events leading up to the operation, as well as what 
was executed within the first 100 hours of OUR, Phase One.   
• During Phase Zero, though SOUTHCOM did conduct training exercises 
and hosted conferences in preparation for disaster response, many of the 
actions that would allow for more efficient execution of logistics and 
contracting support were not in place.  One such example is a predefined 
movement plan coordinated with TRANSCOM planners, and designated 
personnel from SOUTHCOM to liaison at SPOD and APOD and assist in 
directing movements.  These actions would have enhanced supply chain 
visibility, making the flow of material more manageable, and decreasing 
the amount of wasted and unnecessary material in transit.  Also, 
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contracting personnel could have solicited and prepared a list of qualified 
venders in the region, both state side and the area impacted, to be 
periodically reviewed and updated as needed.  Such efforts could have 
possibly expedited the contracting process, been less costly, and instilled 
more confidence in the vender’s ability to deliver.  
• Another setback was the delay in establishing C2 in country, which was 
attributed to the lack of building materials and available sites cleared for 
construction in the early stages of the operation.  Though establishing a 
fully functional C2 within 96 hours of an operation is most critical to the 
success of the actions taken beyond the 100th hour, it is still essential to 
note, as the C2 was to be functional within the period examined for this 
study.  Long-range communications raised issues as well.  Without a 
functioning C2, responders on the ground depended heavily on mobile 
phones, which turned out to be a scarce resource in the beginning.  The 
inability to communicate between SPOD, APOD, and responders in 
country led to huge supply chain inefficiencies and lack of coordination 
between key players.   
• “What went wrong with coordination has ranged from the elementary—
ill-advised handouts of infant formula—to the complex, beginning with 
complaints the U.S. military turned away too many relief flights in the first 
days of crisis…“What’s gone wrong in Haiti?” repeated Laurent Sury, an 
emergency operations deputy with Doctors Without Borders. “The 
earthquake, that’s what went wrong” (Hanley, 2010).   
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the research analysis, the researchers determined that earthquakes and 
disasters will occur, but the ability to effectively respond to those disasters depends on 
proper preparation, training, command and control, communication, and effective 
coordination between all players.  The earthquake may have gone wrong, but the 
response operation to the earthquake disaster need not go wrong as well.  Reflecting on 
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the logistics and contracting actions in the first 100 hours of OUR, the research reveals 
that the overall effort was not as effective as it could have been, which is indicative of the 
amount of preparation at Phase Zero.  Due diligence put into Phase Zero drove the 
productiveness of the succeeding phases of an operation, particularly Phase One.  A data 
logisticians must provide their managers, donors, and stakeholders sound planning based 
on relevant and up-to-date beneficiary needs assessments that must reflect real needs 
rather than third party perceived needs (Whiting & Ayala-Ostrom, 2009).    
Recommendation 1:  
Incorporate Phase Zero planning and preparation in disaster response 
preparedness.   
Pre-planning for contingency contracting and logistics support during Phase Zero 
will facilitate quick and effective responses during disasters or other humanitarian 
response operations.  Pre planning includes proper future requirements determination and 
pre-awards of suitable contracts like IDIQ and MAC, based on requirements 
determination and regional plans.  DoD may also preposition DR requirements with 
Standardize list/ flow diagram to streamline the process.  At Phase Zero, DR personnel 
must be identified and tasks assigned.  Also, cultural, religious, gender, and traditional 
barriers must be identified when determining requirements and assigning personnel 
Recommendation 2: 
 Incorporate the Stella’s Future Model and Yoder Three-Tier Model into 
Planning, Development, Preparation, and Execution of Disaster Response 
Operation.   
Incorporating the SFM will streamline and standardize DoD’s disaster relief 
operations by standardizing training and designating disaster response contracting and 
logistics personnel that will speak the same disaster-response-language and work as one 
unit to improve DoD’s disaster response operations.  Areas covered under the SFM that 




 Segment COCOM AOR into Different Regions.   
Regional segmentations will create two different staging and response locations 
for prepositioning of response requirements.  These two areas may not share common 
boundaries so that if a disaster hits one segment, DoD can still respond from the second 
segment.  This guarantees that DoD will have access to supplies and services regardless 
of disaster location to support disaster victims and DoD responders. 
Recommendation 4: 
 Forge Alliances with USAID and other key players.  
Leveraging the assets provided by other military, foreign government and 
organizations, including NGO/PVO will save time, money and improve the overall 
response effectiveness.   
Recommendation 5: 
 Proper Knowledge Management.   
Managing lessons learned and the knowledge those lessons provide is essential 
for preplanning, preparation and effective disaster response operations.  The U.S. Army 
Operational Knowledge Management proposed that knowledge management supports the 
creation, organization, application and transfer of knowledge to facilitate situational 
understanding and decision making.  In Haiti, situational unawareness was one of the 
dominant factors for the overall ineffectiveness.  Therefore, DoD must not only learn 
from previous disaster response operations including OUR, it must adequately manage 
the knowledge and apply it to the different scenarios of disaster response, at Phase Zero 
and in real-time operations during disaster response operations. 
Recommendation 6: 
 Standardize Disaster Response procedures and protocol.   
All DoD components tasked with disaster response duties must follow 
standardized procedure that will be pre-established and incorporated into the unit 
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commands battle orders.  Supporting and supported roles will be delineated with clarity 
on C2.  Supporting command must follow the standard (established) protocol and may 
not perform task without the approval of the JTF or COCOM responsible for the AOR.  
This will be irrespective of the rank of the specific unit commanders.  This will eliminate 
issues like lack of established command and control, ineffective communication, and 
poor coordination of effort as well as duplication of efforts, waste of resources and assets. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research analysis can be expanded further into Phase One and the subsequent 
phases of Operation Unified Response.  The first 100 hours of the initial phase are 
critical; however, it does not capture the vast amount of logistics and contracting support 
distributed throughout the entire operation.  The researchers suggest the following areas 
for further research: 
1. Perform a quantitative analysis of the logistics and contracting 
effectiveness outside of the first 100 hours.    
The quantitative data not evaluated in this research may be in abundance for 
periods beyond the first 100 hours and would complement the qualitative analysis 
conducted in this research.   
2. Conduct a feasibility study of implementing “Stella’s Future Model” 
and its impact on DoD.   
This will afford DoD a firsthand understanding of how the model works and how 
it can be integrated into the planning, development and execution phases of disaster 
response operations.  It will also provide the operational effectiveness of logistics and 
contracting support services during a DoD disaster response operation. 
3. Perform a cost analysis and other implications of SFM.   
This will show the actual costs savings associated with early integration of 
Contingency Contracting Officers (CCO) and Disaster Response Logisticians (DRL) into 
planning phases and life cycle of contingencies. 
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